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SURVIVING LAWRENCE v. TEXAS 
Marc Spindelman* 
One can't go on writing forever about how hard it is to breathe. 
- Vaclav Havel 
For Anonymous 
INTRODUCTION 
The lesbian and gay communities have reacted to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas1 - striking down state sodomy 
laws on Due Process grounds2 - with unbridled enthusiasm. Lawrence 
has variously been praised as an unmitigated victory for lesbian and 
gay rights,3 a turning point in our community's history,4 and the 
* © 2004 by Marc Spindelman. All rights reserved. Assistant Professor of Law at The 
Ohio State University's Moritz College of Law. - Ed. For conversation or comments that 
were especially helpful as this essay took shape, many thanks to: Doug Berman, Jim 
Brudney, Martha Chamallas, Sarah Cole, Ruth Colker, Charlotte Croson, Sharon Davies, 
Joshua Dressler, Chris Fairman, L. Camille Hebert, Lisae Jordan, Yale Kamisar, Chris 
Kendall, Catharine MacKinnon, Caleb Mason, Mary Ellen O'Connell, Andy Siegel, Peter 
Swire, Adam Thorburn, Robin West, and the participants at the Ohio State Law Journal 
Symposium on Lawrence v. Texas, held on November 7, 2003. Research librarians Kathy 
Hall, Sara Sampson, and Amy Burchfield, as always, provided assistance beyond the 
ordinary call of duty, as did Ohio State University law students Chris Geidner and Peter 
Debelak. Some of the ideas here have been previously published in Sodomy Politics in 
Lawrence v. Texas, JURIST, June 12, 2003, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/ 
forumnewl 15.php. 
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
2. The Court's Lawrence opm10n variously refers to "privacy," see, for example, 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564, "liberty," see, for example, id. at 562, and "autonomy," see, for 
example, id. at 574, hence raises questions about the precise conceptual and doctrinal 
foundation of the substantive due process right to sexual intimacy it announces. See, e.g. , id. 
at 578 (announcing the right). Recognizing there are differences between the terms, the 
analysis I offer here is consistent with all of them. 
3. See, e.g. , John Rechy, Finally, Dignity and Respect - But at Such a Cost, L.A. TIMES, 
June 29, 2003, at MS ("Many will rightly celebrate the decision as an unqualified victory -
and those who brought it about are heroic."). 
4. See, e.g. , Chris Bull, Justice Served, TuE ADVOCATE, Aug. 19, 2003, at 35, 36 
(describing Lawrence as "revolutionary"); Editorial, A Gay Pride Day to Remember, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, July 29, 2003, at 42 ("The ruling was stunning for another reason: For the first 
time in history, the rights of gays to live their lives with dignity, free from state persecution 
and prosecution, was vigorously defended by the nation's highest court - a conservative 
one, at that."). As E.J. Graff put it: 
Lawrence is our Brown v. Board of Education, declaring us full citizens, entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms held by our siblings, colleagues, and friends. Lawrence is our first 
national victory, and for many, it's a tearjerker. From recoil to respect - from criminality to 
citizenship - in just 17 years is so thrilling that it makes this the best gay pride month in 
history. 
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moment when we have gone from second-class political outcasts to 
constitutional persons with first-class rights.5 
Obviously, something remarkable happened in Lawrence. In an 
opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court declared that 
John Geddes Lawrence and Tyrone Gamer, who had been convicted 
under Texas's sodomy law making consensual same-sex sexual activity 
illegal, are no longer sexual criminals. According to Lawrence, 
homosexuals like Lawrence and Garner are "entitled to respect for 
their private lives."6 Therefore, Lawrence teaches, the State cannot 
"demean their existence or control their destiny"7 by making private 
homosexual sexual conduct a crime. The Constitution affords lesbians 
and gay men "the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the govemment,"8 and to engage in that conduct 
without sacrificing their "dignity as free persons."9 After Lawrence, 
sodomy bans, and not the lesbians and gay men that they had 
previously made outlaws, are "derelicts on the waters of the law."10 
The recognition by the Supreme Court of the United States that 
lesbians and gay men are human beings who have "dignity as free 
persons" that is deserving of "full"11 constitutional respect is itself a 
monumental breakthrough. Lawrence is the first Supreme Court 
E.J. Graff, The High Court Finally Gets It Right, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003, at Dll. 
While many others have similarly likened Lawrence to Brown (Katherine Franke collects a 
few noteworthy sources in Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1399 n.2 (2004)), there has been remarkably little serious 
public consideration of what the analogy might suggest about the kind of "breakthrough " 
Lawrence actually represents. Michael Klarman, whose work on Brown has been central to 
recent scholarly reconsiderations of its significance, see Marc Spindelman, Reorienting 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359, 457 n.315 (2001) (hereinafter Spindelman, 
Reorienting Hardwick] (collecting sources, including work by Klarman), productively traces 
the theme in his Brown and Lawrence (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). A pre­
Lawrence variation can be found in Spindelman, Reorienting Hardwick, supra, especially at 
446-488. 
5. See, e.g. , Ed Madden, Ruling Makes Gays, At Last, Equal Citizens, THE STATE.COM, 
June 28, 2003, at http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/columnists/6190528.htm. 
Madden notes: 
Id. 
[Lawrence] comes only a week before the Fourth of July, when Americans celebrate their 
freedoms. It was sometimes difficult to celebrate as a full and equal citizen when the state 
considered you a felon . . . . [When the Court issued its decision in Lawrence], that time bomb 
- the sodomy law - stopped ticking. And for many of us, our lives as full and equal 
citizens . . .  truly began. 
6. 539 U.S. at 578. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 567. 
10. Alabama. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 357 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the result). 
11. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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decision in American history that openly acknowledges this. Not a 
generation ago, the Court scoffed at the suggestion. Speaking for the 
Court in Bowers v. Hardwick,12 Justice Byron White dismissed the 
notion, accepted by Lawrence, that same-sex sexual intimacies deserve 
substantive constitutional protection. For Justice White, the very idea 
was preposterous; "at best, facetious,"13 he famously said. Even 
Charles Fried, Ronald Reagan's former Solicitor General, thought 
that Justice White's Hardwick opinion was "stunningly harsh and 
dismissive."14 The concurring opinion of then-Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, which endorsed William Blackstone's description of sodomy 
as "an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act 'the very 
mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a crime not fit to 
be named[,] ' "  was even more so.15 
Not surprisingly, a large segment of the gay community reacted 
with intense aversion to Hardwick, concluding (with reason) that it 
went beyond a simple affirmation of the constitutionality of sodomy 
laws to the constitutional legitimation of anti-gay animus'6 - an 
12. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). I have previously written about the interpretive possibilities of 
Bowers v. Hardwick, proposing that it can be read as having decided not to decide the merits 
of the substantive due process claim presented in it. Spindelman, Reorienting Hardwick, 
supra note 4. In discussing Hardwick in these pages, I indulge the "standard" reading of it 
(that it rejected Michael Hardwick's substantive due process claim). In doing so, I do not 
abandon my previously stated views. In important ways, Lawrence proves them, though how, 
exactly, awaits explanation on another day. 
13. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194. 
14. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION - A 
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 82 (1991); accord Lance Liebman, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. 
White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 13, 19 & n.22 (1993) (hinting that Hardwick was Justice White's 
"worst decision"). Fried's criticism of Hardwick is cited with approval in Lawrence. 539 U.S. 
at 576 ("In the United States criticism of Bowers has been substantial and continuing, 
disapproving of its reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical assumptions. See, e.g. , 
C[harles] Fried . . . .  "). 
15. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
16. See, e.g., Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal 
Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648, 649 (1987) ("Hardwick rests upon nothing more 
substantial than the collective distaste of the five justices in the majority for the conduct 
under scrutiny."); id. at 655 ("At one point, the majority resorted to a flippancy verging on 
contempt; it described Michael Hardwick's invocation of constitutional protection as 'at best, 
facetious."'); id. ("Justice White and his four colleagues, it seems, simply do not like 
homosexuality, and do not want to elevate or honor it by conferring on it the imprimatur of 
the Constitution of the United States."). A larger helping of sources that treat Hardwick as 
revealing "the pervasiveness of irrational, homophobic, or heterosexist bias within our legal 
regime," can be found in Spindelman, Reorienting Hardwick, supra note 4, at 368-69 n.17 
(collecting sources). To the extent these views are correct, one could say that Hardwick itself 
violated the principle of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which was, on Lawrence's 
understanding of it at least, that anti-gay animus was not constitutionally acceptable under 
the Equal Protection Clause as a basis for governmental action. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 
("We concluded that the provision [previously described as 'class-based legislation directed at 
homosexuals'] was 'born of animosity toward the class of persons affected' and further that it 
had no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose." (emphasis added)). Why 
should the Court's own decisions not be measured by these principled terms? 
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impression confirmed by judicial decisions that followed in its wake.17 
William Rubenstein captured the sentiments of countless lesbian 
women and gay men when he said: "I don't think about sex when I 
read Hardwick and I don't think about what sex acts are at issue [in 
the case] . I think how they hate me. "18 
Seen in contrast, Lawrence has been welcomed as everything 
Hardwick was not. If Hardwick was the case that toe-kicked lesbians 
and gay men in the face,19 Lawrence is the case that brings them inside 
to tend and mend their wounds. Along the way to delivering lesbians 
and gay men dignity and substantive due process rights, the Lawrence 
Court even manages to apologize gently for the things it said and did 
in Hardwick. Lawrence embraces lesbians and gay men, going so far as 
to admit that Hardwick was wrong on the day it was decided, as it is 
wrong today.20 Hence, "Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled."21 To anyone whose life has been overshadowed, 
complicated, demeaned, occupied, even ruined by sodomy laws, rare is 
the flower that has smelled as sweet. Those who wept upon hearing 
the Supreme Court announce its decision in Lawrence (quite a few, 
according to press reports22) must have understood that the 
Constitution's freedoms delivered are a singularly magnificent thing. 
It is thus easy to appreciate the reasons the Supreme Court's 
decision in Lawrence has generated a palpable euphoria within the 
lesbian and gay communities and among a number of their 
heterosexual allies. But much more difficult to understand - and 
unnoticed until now - is what the Court's Lawrence opinion looks 
like to people concerned with inequality between the sexes. From the 
17. See, e.g., Able v. U.S., 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 
1105 (11th Cir. 1997); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 
261, 268 (6th Cir. 1995); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Padula v. Webster, 
822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Limon v. State, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. App. 2002); Bottoms v. 
Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). 
18. Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429, 435 (1997) 
[hereinafter Halley, Romer v. Hardwick] (emphasis added in original) (quoting letter from 
William B. Rubenstein, Consulting Associate Professor, Stanford Law School (Nov. 11 ,  
1996)). 
19. For a note on my use of terminology, see Spindelman, Reorienting Hardwick, supra 
note 4, at 368 n.15. 
20. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. But see Ruthann Robson, The Missing Word in Lawrence 
v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 397, 402 (2004) ("For some, this may have read as an 
apology . . . .  [B]ut it was not the apology that sexual minorities deserve."). 
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
22. See, e.g. , Nina Totenberg, All Things Considered, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, June 
26, 2003 ("Sitting in the courtroom was Harvard law Professor Laurence Tribe . . . .  Today, 
there were tears in his eyes."); Sodomy Ruling: Did the Supreme Court Legislate Morality?, 
THE WEEK, July 18, 2003, at 6 [hereinafter Sodomy Ruling] ("The ruling set off silent 
weeping among the gay lawyers in the Supreme Court chambers . . . .  "); cf Graff, supra note 
4 (saying of Lawrence, "it's a tearjerker"). 
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standpoint of these concerns, Lawrence raises some unmistakable 
danger signs. Before explaining what they are, I begin with an account 
of how they arise. 
I. LA WRENCE'S "LIKE-STRAIGHT" LOGIC 
During the course of the Supreme Court litigation in Lawrence v. 
Texas, lesbian and gay rights advocates broadly united to urge the 
Court to accept a simple postulate when ruling in the case.23 In the 
course of raising both Due Process and Equal Protection challenges to 
Texas's sodomy law, lesbian and gay rights advocates maintained: 
Gays are just like heterosexuals. The normative power of this "like­
straight" idea came from the presumptive goodness of heterosexuality, 
a sexual status that is socially sacrosanct and legally protected.24 
Proponents of this like-straight argument thus said: Lesbians and gay 
men, being just like heterosexuals, are entitled to all the rights 
heterosexuals receive, and for the same reasons. 
To show how good gay could be, the lesbian and gay rights briefs in 
Lawrence went out of their way to praise heterosexuality over and 
over again. One romantic depiction of heterosexual, hence 
homosexual, "domestic bliss," for instance, appeared in the brief filed 
by eighteen of our country's leading constitutional law scholars.25 This 
Law Professors' Brief told the Court that: "By interfering with the 
interest gay people share with all other adults [read: heterosexuals] in 
making choices about their private consensual sexual activity, [Texas's 
23. Bernard Harcourt provocatively describes the entire roster of those supporting 
Lawrence and Garner as a "surprising coalition[,]" full of "telling alliances" and "strange 
bedfellows." Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: "You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian-Free 
Zone": On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers. [Raising 
Questions About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 503, 510 (2004). "To be sure," he writes, "the cornucopia of amicus briefs 
reflects strategy and lobbying on the part of John Lawrence's lawyers." Id. at 511. "But," he 
adds, "more important, it reflects the kind of political coalition-formation that produced the 
result in Lawrence." Id. Needless to say, I do not mean to suggest that all those who were 
part of this coalition should be considered (or are) either advocates or advocacy 
organizations for lesbian and gay rights, at least beyond the borderland of this case. 
24. See, e.g. , Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 
662 (1980) ("If marriage and the traditional family are the archetypal associations protected 
by the emergent freedom of intimate association, it is easy to see how the principle of 
equality presses for extension of that freedom to other relationships.") [hereinafter Karst, 
Freedom of Intimate Association]; see also id. at 682 ("By now it will be obvious that the 
freedom of intimate association extends to homosexual associations as it does to 
heterosexual ones. "); id. at 685 ("The chief importance of the freedom of intimate 
association as an organizing principle in the area of homosexual relationships is that it lets us 
see how closely homosexual associations resemble marriage and other heterosexual 
associations."). 
25. See Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Professors Bruce A. Ackerman et al., 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Brief of Constitutional 
Law Professors]. 
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sodomy law] also interferes with the relationships gay couples 
develop. "26 For a long time, the Brief went on to remind the Justices, 
the Supreme Court had recognized how important heterosexual sexual 
intimacy is.27 And " [t]his is true, "  the Brief intoned, "for gay people no 
less than for heterosexuals. "28 
Just in case anyone - or anyone who happened to sit on the High 
Bench29 was unaware of the breezy similarities between 
homosexuals and heterosexuals, the Law Professors' Brief detailed 
some of the ways that "gay people," just like heterosexuals, "form 
couples and create families that engage in the full range of everyday 
activities, from the most mundane to the most profound."30 Gay 
people, for example, "shop, cook, and eat together."31 (Who knew?) 
They "celebrate the holidays together, and share one another's 
families. "32 They even "make financial and medical decisions for one 
another"33 and "rely on each other for companionship and support. "34 
In sum, " [m]any gay couples share 'the duties and the satisfactions of a 
common home."'35 In these and other ways, the Law Professors' Brief 
insisted, as did other lesbian and gay rights briefs in the case,36 that 
26. Id. at 12. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See High Court Post-Mortem, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at 24, 27 ("We were 
obviously appealing to Justice (Sandra Day] O'Connor and Justice Kennedy " (alteration in 
original) (quoting Paul Smith)). But see Christopher Lisotta, It's About More Than Sodomy, 
L.A. WEEKLY, July 4, 2003, at 16, 17 ("You couldn't have a Justice Powell anymore who had 
complete ignorance of the issue " (quoting Edward Lazarus)). 





35. Id. at 13 (citation omitted). 
36. See, e.g. , Amicus Brief of Human Rights Campaign et al., at 17-18, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (hereinafter HRC Brief] ("Gay men and lesbians 
also tend to live in committed relationships . . . .  Many gay men and lesbians raise children in 
their homes . . . .  Gay men and lesbians serve their country in both civilian and military 
capacities. "); Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of 
Texas in Support of Petitioner at 8, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (hereinafter 
ACLU Brief] ("Lesbians and gay men, no Jess than other individuals, center their lives 
around close-knit emotional bonds. As adults, they form intimate relationships with one 
another, often have or adopt children, and interact with groups of relatives that make up 
their extended families. "  (footnote omitted)). According to the National Lesbian and Gay 
Law Association's brief in Lawrence: 
[A]n individual's homosexuality or bisexuality does not correlate with that individual's 
ability or capacity to perform a range of societal activities . . . .  The simple fact is that gay 
men, lesbians, and bisexuals demonstrate the same range of abilities as do heterosexual 
people: some are intellectually gifted, while others are not; some are strong, while others are 
not; some are mentally or physically disabled, but most are not. 
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homosexuals are just like heterosexuals and, consequently, should be 
afforded all the same rights and privileges that heterosexuals receive. 
As a litigation tactic, this like-straight line of argument achieved its 
desired effect.37 The Court accepts it - and so basically that it 
animates the Court's opinion at every major analytic tum along the 
way to its conclusion that the Constitution protects a right to sexual 
intimacy,38 including its discussion of history, of contemporary legal 
norms, and of precedent. 
With its examination of the history of sodomy laws, the Court 
clears away a significant doctrinal obstacle for declaring that 
homosexuality is just like heterosexuality: the claim, traceable at least 
to Bowers v. Hardwick, that the two should be treated as 
fundamentally different because historically they were. Emphatically 
rejecting Hardwick's assertion that legal proscriptions against 
homosexual sodomy have "'ancient roots,"' Lawrence declares that, 
"there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at 
homosexual conduct as a distinct matter. "39 Lawrence speculates that 
the reason for this may be, as many historians following Michel 
Foucault have argued,40 that "the homosexual as a distinct category of 
Brief of the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association et al., at 14-15, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (emphasis omitted). 
37. The lesbian and gay rights organizations involved in Lawrence wasted little time in 
taking credit for the Court's decision in the case, according to reports in the lesbian and gay 
press. See,  e.g. , Lou Chibbaro Jr., Taking Credit for Lawrence vs. Texas Decision, WASH. 
BLADE, July 18, 2003, at 10. 
38. The salutary meaning of Lawrence for heterosexuality has largely been tacit in 
observations about what Lawrence means. Often it is entirely unexplored. A few have 
recognized the point expressly. See, e.g. , Sodomy Ruling, supra note 22, at 6 ("Straight 
Americans should celebrate too, said Paul Greenberg in The Washington Times."). The 
writers at THE WEEK captured the general sentiment, if not the exact wording, of 
Greenberg's commentary on Lawrence. The closest it actually comes to saying that 
"[s]traight Americans should celebrate, too," is found in its second paragraph: 
The highest court in the land now has agreed with the 19th century English lady who, when 
asked what she thought of homosexuality, replied that she had no objection "if they don't do 
it in the street and frighten the horses. " Which remains a good rule for heterosexual relations 
as well, while we're on the subject of the equal protection of the laws. 
Paul Greenberg, Privacy's Revival, THEW ASH. TIMES, July 2, 2003, at 15. 
39. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568, 570 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 
(1986)). 
40. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. I: AN INTRODUCTION 43 
(Robert Hurley trans., 1990). As Foucault observed: 
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; 
their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth­
century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition 
to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and 
possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was 
unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at .the root of all his actions 
because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face 
and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away. It was consubstantial with him, 
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person did not emerge until the late 19th century."41 Careful to avoid 
placing too much weight on this view, the Court continues, "early 
American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but 
instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more 
generally. "42 
In saying so, the Court takes pains to point out that it does not 
mean to suggest historical approval of what it itself thinks of as 
"homosexual conduct"43 in the early American period. But it does 
believe that the historical evidence "tend[ s] to show that this particular 
form of conduct was not thought of as a separate category from like 
less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature . . . .  The sodomite had been a temporary 
aberration; the homosexual was now a species. 
Id. The idea that nothing in the homosexual's "total composition was unaffected by his 
sexuality" adds suspension to the conceptual bridge spanning Lawrence's recognition of a 
right to sexual intimacy and the otherwise almost ontological-sounding claim that Lawrence 
protects a constitutional right "to be gay." The Editors of the Harvard Law Review venture 
such a claim in Leading Cases, 1 17 HARV. L. REV. 226, 298 (2003) (Lawrence "not only 
rejects the narrow notion that same-sex sexual activity is constitutionally unprotected, but 
also advances the broader notion that there is a fundamental right to be gay - to express 
one's sexuality openly and without fear of state-sanctioned retribution, to engage in lasting, 
intimate relationships with members of the same sex, and to define the terms of those 
relationships, including by forming a family. " (footnote omitted)). 
41. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568. Didier Eribon notes that, in work preceding The History 
of Sexuality, Foucault located the invention of the homosexual - if not "homosexuality" as 
such - in the seventeenth century. DIDIER ERIBON, INSULT AND THE MAKING OF THE GA y 
SELF 8, 267-72, 281 (Michael Lucey trans., 2004). As to "homosexuality," Eribon remarks: 
"the word homosexuality itself . . .  was coined in 1869 by Karl Maria Kertbeny, an Austro­
Hungarian man of letters who was also struggling for the repeal of laws penalizing 
homosexual acts with imprisonment." Id. at 288. For the (for-now) largely marginalized idea 
that there is a considerably longer history of gay culture than either of Foucault's claims 
might be taken to suggest, see JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND 
HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 
CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1981); see also, e.g. , JOHN BOSWELL, 
SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994). Eribon offers thoughts on Boswell's 
work in ERIBON, supra at 325. According to Eribon, Foucault himself was far more 
sympathetic to Boswell's views than many of his American interlocutors have been. Id. at 
315, 318. 
What the periodization of "homosexuality" may mean for its treatment as a "suspect 
classification" for equal protection purposes is unclear, even leaving aside the thoroughly­
vetted (though likely to be on-going) "immutability" debate. What does seem worth noting, 
however, is that even as Lawrence seems to cut lesbians and gay men as such off from any 
longstanding history of (their) identity, it reconnects victims and survivors of sexual abuse to 
theirs. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48 (discussing the suggestion found in Lawrence 
that sodomy laws historically dealt with sexual abuse, filling in rape laws' gaps). The classic, 
though incomplete, history of sexual violence remains SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST 
OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). 
42. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568. George Chauncey writes: "For the Court to acknowledge 
an argument about the historicity of the category of the homosexual - or even to recognize 
the historical shift in state regulatory regimes - especially in a way that advanced the cause 
of gay rights, would have been almost unimaginable just a decade ago. " George Chauncey, 
"What Gay Studies Taught the Court, " The Historians ' Amicus Brief in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 
GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 509, 511  (2004). 
43. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568. 
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conduct between heterosexual persons."44 If so, it follows that the 
history of sodomy laws could not support - much less justify -
treating homosexuality as different than heterosexuality. 
Having disposed of this old canard, the Court develops an 
affirmative history of sodomy laws that emphasizes their non­
enforcement whether homosexuality or heterosexuality was involved. 
The Court states in broad terms - terms that on their own treat 
homosexuality and heterosexuality alike - that in the nineteenth 
century, "[l]aws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been 
enforced against consenting adults acting in private."45 Records of 
sodomy prosecutions and convictions in this era, for instance, are said 
to show that what the State sought to punish through sodomy bans 
were "predatory acts against those who could not or did not consent, 
as in the case of a minor or the victim of an assault"46 - same-sex and 
cross-sex sexual acts not otherwise covered by then-existing criminal 
rape prohibitions.47 These prosecutions, if not also the underlying 
conduct, were "infrequen[t] ,"48 the Court says. Thus, the Court 
reasons, it is "difficult to say that society approved of a rigorous and 
systematic punishment of the consensual acts committed in private and 
by adults."49 
The Court does acknowledge that "there may have been periods in 
which there was public criticism of homosexuals as such and an 
insistence that the criminal laws be enforced to discourage their 
practices."50 (True enough: There were.) But reported cases in the 
period between 1880 and 1995, the years since homosexuality's 
approximate invention,51 while "not always clear in the details,"52 
indicate that even private, consensual homosexual conduct normally 
went unregulated. The Court makes this point by drawing attention to 
the type of homosexual conduct that was (sometimes) prosecuted: 
" [A] significant number [of sodomy decisions] involved [homosexual] 
conduct in a public place."53 More directly, the Court avers that 
recently, "[i]n those States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether 





49. Id. at 569-70. 
50. Id. at 570 
51. But see supra notes 40-41. 
52. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570. 
53. Id. 
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for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of 
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private."54 
Moving diachronically, the Court finds that this pattern held even 
though, starting in the 1970s, some States began to single out 
homosexual sodomy for criminal punishment.55 Those laws, too, 
including Texas's, typically were not enforced, the Court notes, adding 
that a good number of them have been abolished altogether, along 
with other state sodomy bans that (before their erasure) had operated 
across the board. Following Justice Felix Frankfurter's submission that 
" '[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy . .  . '  
- or not carrying it out - 'are often tougher and truer law than the 
dead words of the written text,"'56 Lawrence practically teaches that 
the "true law" of sodomy, both historically and contemporaneously, 
has not entailed a prohibition against private sexual conduct between 
consenting adults. In this respect, homosexuality has been treated like 
heterosexuality under law, hence in fact. And this is true, the Court 
elsewhere explains, not only locally, but also internationally. Our legal 
system shares its norms about private, consensual expressions of 
sexuality in common with other civilized Western nations.57 
The Court's analysis of the historical and contemporaneous 
treatment of sodomy at law comes in a larger discussion of the Court's 
own precedents, including Hardwick. In Lawrence, the Court 
54. Id. at 573. 
55. Id. at 570. 
56. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502 (1961) (Frankfurter, J. , plurality opinion) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Browning, 310 
U.S. 362, 369 (1940). In its discussion of contemporaneous legal treatment of sodomy, 
Lawrence invokes Justice Lewis Powell's separate Hardwick opinion, which suggested, 
among other things, that then-existing sodomy prohibitions "often were being ignored. " 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. It then (parenthetically) quotes his observation that "[t)he history 
of nonenforcement [of sodomy laws] suggests the moribund character today of laws 
criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct. " Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186, 197-98 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring)). I discuss Powell's Hardwick opinion in 
considerable detail, including its relationship to Frankfurter's observations in Poe v. Ullman, 
in Spindelman, Reorienting Hardwick, supra note 4, at 402-27. 
57. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (citing THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (Authorized Am. ed. 
1963), and subsequent Parliamentary action substantially endorsing it, Sexual Offences Act, 
1967, § 1 (Eng.), as well as Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981), a 
European Court of Human Rights decision that is described by the Court as "[a)uthoritative 
in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe "); id. at 576-77 (citing Dudgeon, 
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981); P.G. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98 'II 56 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993); Norris Case, 142 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson et al. at 11-12 , 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae of Mary 
Robinson]). For some limitations on Lawrence's reliance on the British sources that it itself 
does not note, see JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY 109-110 (2d ed. 2003) (venturing, then 
explaining, the idea that " [t)he reforms conformed . . .  to a liberal strategy which limited 
direct interference in private lives[,) [b)ut they did not necessarily abandon the idea of 
control . . .  [or] positively enshrine new rights"). 
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interprets its prior decisions again and again in like-straight terms. 
That the Court deploys a like-straight interpretive lens to read - or 
re-read - its precedents becomes apparent no later than when it 
offers its gloss on the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey.58 
The Casey plurality, says Lawrence, definitively provided that 
substantive due process requires respect for the autonomy of the 
person in making decisions "relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education."59 In 
Casey's now-famous formulation, reiterated in Lawrence: "At the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs 
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State."60 Offering a like­
straight interpretation of Casey's transcendent definition of "liberty," 
Lawrence posits that, " [p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may 
seek autonomy for these purposes [of defining 'one's own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and the mystery of human life'], 
just as heterosexual persons do."61 Homosexuals are persons too, and 
persons first: " [p ]ersons in a homosexual relationship. "62 
To establish that the Court's like-straight thinking is basic, not 
peripheral, to its discussion of its own precedents, hence to its decision 
in Lawrence, one need not look beyond the Court's announcement 
that the "analysis" Justice John Paul Stevens offered in his dissenting 
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick "should have been controlling in 
58. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. Indeed, I think this point is apparent a good deal earlier 
in its opinion. By the time that Lawrence opens, like-straight reasoning has already led the 
Court to assimilate homosexuality to a heterosexual norm, thus enabling the Court to speak 
in sexual-orientation-neutral terms about the rights of "persons," which now, formally, 
includes lesbians and gay men. See infra text accompanying notes 63-71 (discussing Justice 
Stevens' dissenting opinion in Hardwick). 
60. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851, quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
61. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added). 
62. Id. To similar effect is Lawrence's description of Hardwick's constitutional 
misprisions. Lawrence proposes, for instance, that Hardwick "demean[ed]" the right to 
sexual intimacy asserted in that case by describing it as "simply the right to engage in certain 
sexual conduct." Id. at 567. Why? Lawrence gives its answer through a like-straight analogy. 
Saying that the right to sexual intimacy involved in Hardwick is nothing more than another 
way to refer to a right to homosexual sodomy is demeaning in "just [the same way] as it 
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have 
sexual intercourse. " Id. Accord Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985) 
("The benefits of marriage can inure to individuals outside the traditional marital 
relationship. For some, the sexual activity in question here serves the same purpose as the 
intimacy of marriage. "); see also supra note 24. Competent legal readers are supposed to 
know, and fill in the missing conceptual gap: marriage is never about just sex. For the 
Lawrence Court, the insult of proposing that it is, is self-evident. 
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[Hardwick] and should control here."63 Even a casual perusal of Justice 
Stevens's Hardwick dissent reveals that like-straight reasoning was its 
grund-motiv. 
Justice Stevens opened his dissent by framing the controversy that 
Hardwick pressed, hence the error of Justice White's opinion for the 
Court, in like-straight terms: "Like the statute that is challenged in this 
case, the rationale of the Court's opinion applies equally to the 
prohibited conduct regardless of whether the parties who engage in it 
are married or unmarried, or are of the same or different sexes."64 The 
reason - unarticulated, but implicit, at this early point in the dissent 
- is that homosexuality is just like heterosexuality. Exposing its like­
straight logic in terms, the dissent continued: "Sodomy was 
condemned as an odious and sinful type of behavior during the 
formative period of the common law. That condemnation was equally 
damning for heterosexual and homosexual sodomy."65 In the very next 
paragraph, the dissent returned to the equation between 
homosexuality and heterosexuality twice: 
Th e  history of the G eorgia statute before us c learly reveals this 
trad itional prohibition of heterosexual, as well as homosexual, 
sod omy . . . .  Th e  history of the statutes cited by the majority as proof f or 
the proposition that sod omy is not c onstitutionally protec ted . . .  similarly 
reveals a prohibition on heterosexual, as well as homosexual, sod omy. "66 
And once more in the next paragraph, in a fashion that would later be 
copied in the majority opinion in Lawrence: "the Georgia statute 
expresses the traditional view that sodomy is an immoral kind of 
conduct regardless of the identity of the persons who engage in it. "67 
"Regardless," because homosexuals, like heterosexuals, are persons. 
The dissent's ensuing discussion proceeded to drive its like-straight 
point home. Consistent with then-existing privacy precedents, the 
State could not - as Georgia had - "totally prohibit" sodomy.68 
Doing so, the dissent maintained, "clear[ly]" violated the 
constitutional privacy rights heterosexuals, both married and single, 
enjoyed.69 
63. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
64. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 168, 214 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
65. Id. at 214-15. 
66. Id. at 215-16. 
67. Id. at 216. 
68. Id. at 218. 
69. Id. Lawrence expressly affirms the substance of this reasoning, quoting Justice 
Stevens's Hardwick dissent on the point. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("[I]ndividual 
decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship . . .  are 
a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .  
[T]his protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons." 
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This deduction from the Court's privacy precedents was the 
dissent's intermediate holding, and simultaneously the predicate for its 
reasoning that the Due Process Clause's right to sexual intimacy, 
having been recognized for heterosexuals, was to be offered on equal, 
which is to say, like-straight terms to lesbians and gay men. As the 
dissent observed: 
Although the meaning of the princ iple that " all men are c reated eq ual" is 
not always c lear, it surely must mean that every f ree c itizen has the same 
interest in " liberty" that the members of the [ heterosexual] majority 
share. From the stand point of the ind ivid ual, the homosexual and the 
heterosexual have the same interest in d ec id ing how he will live his own 
lif e, and, more narrowly, how he will c ond uc t himself in his personal and 
voluntary assoc iations with his c ompanions. State intrusion into the 
private c ond uc t of either is eq ually burd ensome. 70 
From a dissent in Hardwick, to a majority opinion in Lawrence: So it 
was written, so it is done. As Lawrence declares: Justice Stevens' 
analysis "should have been controlling in [Hardwick] and should 
control here."71 It does. 
Given only the position it takes on the relationship between 
homosexuality and heterosexuality, the Lawrence Court could have 
found itself in (complete) agreement with Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in the case. Joining her, it might have said that 
because homosexuality is just like heterosexuality, Texas's 
(omissions of footnotes and citations in original) (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 216 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). But see Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 83, 86 ("(T]he Court has given no support to the 
notion that the right of privacy protects sexual freedom."); id. at 88 n.31 (challenging the 
assertion that Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), established "a right of sexual 
freedom for the unmarried," with the suggestion that, "surely you can have a right to wear 
motorcycle helmets when you ride a motorcycle, without having a right to ride a 
motorcycle," and with the doctrinal observation that "the Court itself has continued to insist 
on the disjunction between the right of access to contraceptives and the right of sexual 
freedom" (citing Carey v. Population Serv. Int'/, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1976) (plurality 
opinion of Brennan, J.))); accord Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, supra note 18, at 448 (offering 
that Hardwick engaged in an "act of forgetting and thus protecting heterosexual sodomy"). 
As Justice Brennan wrote in Carey: 
Contrary to the suggestion advanced in Mr. Justice Powell's opinion, we do not hold that 
state regulation must meet this standard "whenever it implicates sexual freedom," or 
"affect[s] adult sexual relations[.]" ... . As we observe below, "the Court has not definitely 
answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state 
statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults," and we do not 
purport to answer that question now. 
431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (first and final alterations in original) (quoting id. at 703, 704 (Powell, 
J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The Lawrence Court's discussion of Carey, see 539 U.S. at 
566, does not acknowledge this limitation. Cf Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 403 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("When a State allocates benefits or burdens, it 
may have valid reasons for treating married and unmarried persons differently.") 
70. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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"homosexual sodomy" ban, which outlaws same-sex but not cross-sex 
sodomy, is void on Equal Protection grounds.72 Without any adequate 
justification, it impermissibly treats homosexuality and heterosexuality 
as though they were unalike.73 
The Court instead deems Justice O'Connor's rationale "tenable,"74 
as it must to validate its own, but then speeds past it to declare that all 
sodomy bans - whether limited to same-sex sexual conduct or 
applicable to cross-sex conduct as well - are offensive to the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which assures a right 
to sexual intimacy. In doing so, as some commentators have reminded 
us,75 the Court dramatically reaches out in a way not required by the 
law nominally before it for review. It embraces a rationale that 
exceeds what is logically and jurisprudentially necessary to reverse the 
convictions and overturn the statute at issue in the case. Just so, the 
Court does not so much disregard the oft-cited principle against 
"formulat[ing] a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by 
the precise facts to which it is to be applied"76 as it flouts it. 
72. ld. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Kenneth Karst discusses Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in Lawrence in the context of a larger analysis of the substance of her 
"equal citizenship" jurisprudence in Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance 
of Equal Citizenship, 2003 SUP. Cr. REV. 357, 440-42 (2004). 
73. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence formally declines to join in overruling 
Hardwick. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Court today 
overrules Bowers v. Hardwick. I joined [Hardwick], and do not join the Court in overruling 
it." (citation omitted)). What would remain of Hardwick after she has rejected its premise 
that homosexuality and heterosexuality are unalike, is unclear. Not much, I suspect. 
74. ld. at 574. Technically, the Court affixes the adjective "tenable" to an equal 
protection argument that Lawrence and Garner and some amici made. But since this is the 
argument that Justice O'Connor's separate opinion accepts and builds on, I treat "tenable" 
as a transitive adjective, applicable to the equal protection rationale found there, as well. I 
am in good company in doing so. Sherry Colb, for example, writes: 
The Court might have ruled that, as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said in a concurrence in 
the judgment, such targeting [of homosexuals by Texas's sodomy law] violates the equality 
rights of homosexual persons. 
Though "[t]hat is a tenable argument," the Court explained, however, "[w]ere we to hold 
the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a 
prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between 
.same-sex and different-sex participants." Implicitly, the Court was suggesting that the statute 
would fail Equal Protection analysis as well. 
Sherry F. Colb, Welcoming Gay People Back Into the Fold: The Supreme Court Overrules 
Bowers v. Hardwick, FIND LA W'S WRIT, June 30, 2003, at http://writ.findlaw.com/colb/ 
20030630.html (alterations in original) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75). 
75. See, e.g. , Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?: A Symposium, COMMENT., Oct. 
2003, at 44-45 (response of Cass R. Sunstein) ("There was a narrower and more cautious 
ground [than the one the Court employed], emphasized by Justice O'Connor, for 
invalidating the Texas law."); id. at 47-48 (response of James Q. Wilson) ("The Texas 
sodomy case could well have been decided on grounds that would not have broadened the 
notion of privacy or weakened the concept of state authority . . . .  This would have left the 
states free to ban sodomy for heterosexuals and homosexuals equally . . ..  "). 
76. See, e.g. , Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 
(1885), cited in RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 5 TREATISE ON 
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Doctrinal lavishness like this cannot simply be touted and enjoyed. 
It must be explained. The Court's Lawrence opinion itself provides the 
outline of an account when it tells us that the like-straight logic found 
in Justice O'Connor's concurrence is too thin in its exclusive focus on 
the differential treatment of same-sex and cross-sex sodomy. The 
Court warns that Justice O'Connor's approach would leave "some [to] 
question whether a prohibition [against sodomy] would be valid if 
drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex 
and different-sex participants."77 In the Court's view, that is bad. 
Foreclosing the possibility, the Court effectively exposes the 
relative thickness - the underlying substantivity - of its own like­
straight logic. What leads the Court to surpass Justice O'Connor's 
conclusion to reach its own, as suggested by the touchstone of its like­
straight reasoning, is its solicitude for heterosexual sexual rights. 
Lesbians and gay men receive the sexual rights that heterosexuals do 
by analogical extension.78 Hence the Court's boast that " [e]quality of 
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct 
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in 
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 246 n.7 (3d ed. 1999). Interestingly, 
Tom Stoddard criticized Hardwick on just these grounds. "In resolving the issue of 
constitutionality," he explained, "the [Hardwick] Court undeniably exceeded its authority." 
Stoddard, supra note 16, at 651. He continued: 
Id. 
[The Court] also ignored the long-standing tenet that constitutional decisions, because of 
their gravity, should be issued only on the basis of a well-developed record and well-framed 
issues. The majority was apparently so eager to hand down a ruling on sexual privacy that it 
either overlooked or deliberately disregarded the posture of the case before it. Given the 
importance of the ultimate constitutional question raised in Hardwick, the majority's zeal is 
more than improper; it verges on scandalous. 
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
78. Justice O'Connor offers reassurances in this regard. She is, she tells us, "confident" 
that sodomy laws will not long continue to stand once it is understood, as she would have let 
it be understood, that they must be written and applied in like-straight terms. Id. at 584 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). "Heterosexual sodomites" are not without their political power, 
as Justice O'Connor surely knows. Her opinion seems to be relying on them, and others in 
the heterosexual majority, joined by their homosexual (and other sexually-identified) allies, 
to build the political coalitions capable of making her like-straight reasoning - hence the 
Equal Protection Clause - substantive. In this sense at least, it might be thought that Justice 
O'Connor's Lawrence concurrence is meant to recognize a right to sexual intimacy much as 
the Lawrence majority does, albeit through different - and (formally) more democratic -
means. Remembering, perhaps, that notwithstanding Justice's O'Connor's "confidence," 
nine states still prohibited same-sex and cross-sex sodomy on the morning that Lawrence was 
decided, see, e.g. , Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence's Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1178 
n.40 (2004) (describing Justice O'Connor's confidence as "oblivious to the majority opinion's 
observation [not to mention the fact underlying it] that nine such laws, all of long standing, 
were among those invalidated by the Court's decision."), the majority refuses to take odds 
on her intuition. Thus, it makes her prediction real - today - as a formally new substantive 
due process rule. 
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interests."79 Translated: the Court vindicates sexual liberty by 
recogmzmg heterosexuals' sexual rights and advances "equality of 
treatment" by extending that liberty to lesbians and gay men.80 Rights 
that are made to the king's measure are fit for a queen. 
The. Court reinforces this understanding of its opinion's 
heterosexualized engine in various other ways. Perhaps the easiest to 
see is the one found in the analytic correspondence Lawrence creates 
between itself and Justice Stevens' Hardwick dissent. That dissent, 
recall, explained that substantive due process decisions before 
Hardwick had made it "abundantly clear" that "individual decisions by 
married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical 
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form 
of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment[;]"81 and that the same "protection extends to intimate 
choices by unmarried . . .  persons," by which the dissent meant (as its 
text elucidated) "unmarried heterosexual adults."82 Accordingly, the 
Due Process Clause protected heterosexual sexual intimacies,83 hence 
prohibited bans on sodomy tout court. Only after the dissent had 
reached this conclusion did it go on to apply the distributive like­
straight rule it had previously endorsed, to hold that the constitutional 
protections accorded to heterosexual sexual intimacies could not 
justifiably be denied lesbians and gay men. This is the structure of the 
decision whose analysis prefigures Lawrence. Iteratively, 
heterosexuals' constitutional entitlements are the model for the 
constitutional rights lesbians and gay men receive. 
79. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. The Court continues: 
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its 
substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for 
equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the 
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and private spheres. 
Id. The "invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination," like the "stigma" that 
produces and results from it, is measured against a heterosexual baseline. Lesbians and gay 
men, that is to say, are subordinated and stigmatized for their "deviation" from 
heterosexuality's norms. 
80. This, then, is the (short) answer to Robert Post's question about why the Lawrence 
Court did not "use the Equal Protection Clause to overrule [Hardwick]." Robert C. Post, 
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 99 (2003). 
81. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
82. Id. at 218; see also id. at 216. 
83. Id. at 218 ("Paradoxical as it may seem, our prior cases thus establish that a State 
may not prohibit sodomy within 'the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms,' or, indeed, 
between unmarried heterosexual adults. In all events, it is perfectly clear that the State of 
Georgia may not totally prohibit the conduct proscribed by" its sodomy law. (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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Seen in this light, Lawrence's reversal of Hardwick nicely (and 
happily) follows. Hardwick is "contradict[ed]"84 by those decisions 
"before and after its issuance"85 - from Griswold v. Connecticut86 
through Casey that affirm the constitutional protections 
heterosexuals have "taken for granted . . .  either because they already 
have them or do not need them."87 Hardwick is the anomaly in this 
doctrinal line, produced by the Court's failure "to appreciate the 
extent of the liberty at stake" in the case - for heterosexuals.88 It 
"misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented to it, and thus 
[stated Hardwick's] claim to be whether there [was] a fundamental 
right to engage in consensual [homosexual] sodomy" - a claim it 
rejected.89 With Justice Stevens, Lawrence reads Hardwick effectively 
to have dealt a blow to heterosexual sexual rights. It placed them in a 
state of constitutional "uncertainty"90 by bracketing them in order to 
have a clean shot at the suggestion it repudiated, that homosexuals 
were entitled to sexual liberty. Removing those brackets, hence 
rescuing heterosexuality from itself, Lawrence, citing principles of 
stare decisis, declares that Hardwick must give way. Overruling 
Hardwick, including its holding on homosexual sodomy, Lawrence 
restores the rule of law, whose own governing rules, it seems, remain 
heterosexually driven.91 No wonder that Justice Scalia's very angry 
dissent, which correctly sees the like-straight writing on the wall, 
complains that Lawrence "dismantles the structure of constitutional 
84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
85. Id. 
86. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
87. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). Lawrence's brief discussion of Evans can 
be placed in this line, read as a substantive affirmation of heterosexual rights - rights that 
heterosexuals had, in Evans' own language, largely "taken for granted . . .  either because 
they already have them or do not need them." Id. Then again, even on the standard reading 
of Evans as a lesbian and gay rights, and not a heterosexual rights, Equal Protection case, it 
can be seen to have prefigured, and to have been precedent for, Lawrence's like-straight 
analysis, hence Lawrence's announcement of the heterosexualized "right to sexual intimacy," 
along with its extension to lesbians and gay men on equal terms. See supra notes 78-80 and 
accompanying text. 
88. Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 567. In the very next sentence, Lawrence offers the following 
like-straight observation: To suggest, as Hardwick did, "that the issue in [Hardwick) was 
simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim [that Hardwick) put 
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about 
the right to have sexual intercourse." Id. I discuss this language in note 62, supra. 
89. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
90. Id. at 577. 
91. Cf Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Inequality in Lawrence v. 
Texas, Presentation at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Ohio State Law 
Journal Symposium on Lawrence v. Texas (Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter MacKinnon, The Road 
Not Taken] (describing Lawrence as "sexually driven"). 
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law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual 
and homosexual unions."92 It has. 
Interestingly, unlike the lesbian and gay rights briefs in the case, 
the Lawrence Court does not articulate an independent justification 
for heterosexuality's entitlement to constitutional respect, particularly 
in its sexual intimacies. Perhaps it does not perceive the need. The 
Court might imagine, as many of Lawrence's readers surely will, that 
its reaffirmation of all the rights that the Due Process Clause 
substantively protects, performs all the normative work required to 
establish the richness of heterosexual life - a life filled with the pride 
and joy of what substantive due process entails: marriage, family, 
procreation, and child rearing.93 And now, sexual intimacy. In the 
Court's words: "When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a 
personal bond that is more enduring."94 (How sweet.) Should 
Lawrence regard heterosexuality as deserving of constitutional rights, 
and homosexuality, too, precisely to the degree it is just like 
heterosexuality, who would seriously complain that the premise of the 
analogy is wrong? Judging from the massive outpouring of support for 
the Court's decision in Lawrence, especially in the lesbian and gay 
communities, not many.95 But there are a few,% sex-equality theorists 
foremost among them. 
92. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
93. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190 ("The reach of this line of cases was . . . described as 
dealing with child rearing and education; with family relationships; with procreation; with 
marriage; with contraception; and with abortion." (citations omitted)). 
94. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
95. Cf Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1722-23 (1993) [hereinafter Halley, Reasoning About 
Sodomy]. Halley suggests the possibility that: 
gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and their allies . .. can form new alliances along the register of 
acts. From that vantage point the instability of heterosexual identity can be exploited, and 
indeed, undermined from within. To be sure, adopting this approach requires that lesbians, 
gay men, and bisexuals place their identities as such in abeyance at least from time to time. 
This is dangerous, but it may be the only way that lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals can gain 
some kind of rhetorical leverage in a rhetorical system whose instability normally places us 
in a double bind. 
Id. I am not certain whether the broad-based support for Lawrence is one of those "alliances 
along the register of acts." It could be. See supra note 23. Thoughts on what it means if it is, 
and for whom, are found in Part II, infra. 
96. Of the already-published work on Lawrence, Franke, supra note 4, should be 
counted here. Her objections aim in different directions than mine, but there are a few points 
of convergence. 
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II. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
Anyone who is seriously dedicated to equality between the sexes 
has to acknowledge the historic breakthrough for lesbian and gay 
rights that Lawrence represents. The elimination of discrimination 
against lesbians and gay men, integral to sexual hierarchy and the 
positioning of men and women within it, is indispensable to sexual 
equality's realization. As an affirmation of lesbian and gay rights, then, 
sex-equality theorists have some reason to be pleased about Lawrence. 
I, for one, am. 
But there is more to the evaluation of a judicial text than a simple 
assessment of, or reaction to, its ostensible ends. Looking beyond what 
seems to be Lawrence's bottom line, its like-straight reasoning -
especially its uncritical solicitude for heterosexuality, and the 
corresponding notion, reflected in its protection of a right to sexual 
intimacy, that heterosexuality is entitled to constitutional protections, 
in its intimacies above all - is cause for serious concern.97 
To begin, empirical investigations into the conditions of sex 
inequality have demonstrated that heterosexuality is hardly as 
unproblematic as the Court's opinion in Lawrence may make it seem. 
These investigations have shown, for instance, that the institution of 
heterosexuality has largely been defined in male-supremacist terms -
terms that include both the massive production and the massive denial 
of the sexual abuse and violence that women suffer at men's hands, 
along with the sexualized dimensions of the homophobic violence 
lesbians and gay men suffer at the hands of presumptively 
97. Sex-equality theorists see in Lawrence the invigoration of formal-equality thinking 
that requires members of socially subordinated groups - be they women or non­
heterosexuals - to conform to the norms of socially dominant classes in order to be afforded 
their rights. As sex-equality theory has analyzed it, such formal-equality logic can be - and 
often is - a cover for social dominance posing as "equality," hence a form of "unreason," 
that is anything but a way to eradicate social hierarchy. It delivers rights, as Lawrence does, 
on the terms that the socially privileged set for themselves, assuming as it does that socially 
dominant groups - whether men, or in Lawrence, heterosexuals - should be the standard 
against which constitutional claims are judged and rights both discovered and delivered. 
Lawrence's status as a substantive due process decision does not change this; its underlying 
equality logic can easily expand to infuse equal protection reasoning. Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence in Lawrence demonstrates as much. See also, e.g. , Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438 (1972); Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, supra note 24, at 653 ("Equal protection 
doctrine has been employed frequently by the Supreme Court in the defense of the freedom 
of intimate association. (T]here is a historical sense in which today's version of that freedom 
is derivative from the 'egalitarian revolution' in modem constitutional law." (footnote 
omitted)); id. at 659-64 (discussing intimate association and equal protection). The inequality 
logic animating Hardwick's substantive due process ruling certainly did. See, e.g., High Tech 
Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 572 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. 
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Should Lawrence's 
reasoning likewise expand to define equality rights, it could operate not simply as a new 
floor for lesbian and gay rights, but also as a ceiling, making it harder for them and other 
socially subordinated groups to gain substantive equality through law and in life. 
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heterosexual men. The commonplace that sexual intimacy of the sort 
Lawrence approves should be heralded as the measure of non­
violation has been uncovered as a myth, a way of ignoring and 
protecting the widespread abuses, including sexual assault, domestic 
violence, and sexual abuse of children, by more powerful partners in 
intimate relationships, typically, though not exclusively, men.98 When 
98. The myth is perpetuated, in part, through the non-enforcement and under­
enforcement of laws that are supposed to protect individuals against gender-based violence, 
whether cross-sex, see Developments in the Law - Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: 
N. Making State Institutions More Responsive, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1555-56 (1993) 
("[C]ases of domestic violence have been assigned low priority . . . . Furthermore, because of 
the special complications that surround the prosecution of batterers, prosecutors have too 
often dropped domestic abuse cases under the misperception that they are unwinnable or 
have too readily conceded to the victim's request not to prosecute."), or same-sex. See, e.g. , 
MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 
216-18 (1997) (discussing "police insensitivity" to victims of same-sex rape); Peter Kwan, 
Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1257-58 (1997) 
(discussing the now-infamous episode in which three white police officers who discovered 
fourteen-year-old Konerak Sinthasomphone running down the street naked in an attempt to 
flee from Jeffrey Dahmer, returned him to Dahmer's custody after Dahmer informed them 
that "Konerak's name was 'John Hmong,' that he was 19 years old, that they were lovers, 
and that Konerak had drank too much and wandered naked into the street while Dahmer 
was out getting more beer"); Rus Ervin Funk, Men Who Are Raped: A Profeminist 
Perspective, in SCARCE, supra, at 221, 229-30 (offering first-hand account of male rape 
survivor's engagement with the criminal justice system, including pressure by prosecutors "to 
leave out the sexual assault part of the attack" he suffered, because the "district attorney felt 
strongly that we could get a longer conviction if we ignored the rape"; "[i]n retrospect," 
Funk writes, "the district attorney was probably right"); Wendy Kaufman, All Things 
Considered: Profile: Federal Efforts to Define and End Prison Rape, NATIONAL PvBLIC 
RADIO, Oct. 29, 2003 (quoting Association of State Correctional Administrators' President 
Reginald Wilkinson saying about rape in prison (while apparently confusing it with bad sex): 
"We're not naive enough to say that it doesn't exist from time to time. Typically when it does 
exist, it's a consensual sex act and typically one that's gone bad"). The legal system has also 
affirmatively allowed intimacy to serve as a justification for sexual and sexualized violence. 
See, e.g. , Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper 
Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1470-71 
(2003) ("[T]wenty-six states retain marital immunity in one form or another."); Kwan, supra, 
at 1261-62 ("Gabrish and Balcerzak claim[ed] that they had in fact been deceived and 
convinced by Dahmer," and also "that the circumstances, including what they observed and 
heard from Dahmer, justified their handling of the situation and should mitigate the official 
finding of negligence on their part." (internal citations and emphasis omitted)). One 
egregious, as well as blatant example, is the so-called "homosexual panic" defense, 
sometimes alternatively known as the "gay panic" or "homosexual advance" defense, in 
which an (ostensible) overture to same-sex sexual intimacy can be enough to tum what 
would otherwise be murder into manslaughter. Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in 
Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 
134 (1992) ("As the law now stands . . .  a homosexual advance can mitigate murder to 
manslaughter." (internal citations omitted)). See also, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, "Secret 
Sewers of Vice:" Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 19, 35-38 (Susan A. 
Bandes ed., 1999) (challenging the rule). For one defense of some forms of the non-violent 
"homosexual advance" defense, see Joshua Dressler, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill 
"Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Reasonable 
Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995). My colleague Joshua Dressler 
reminds me that a "homosexual panic" claim is sometimes offered as a kind of insanity 
defense in an effort to avoid all criminal responsibility for a same-sex homicide involving a 
decedent who was (or was thought to be) gay and who had allegedly made a sexual advance 
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sexual intimacy is thought to be normatively good, the basis for 
relationships "more enduring," as it is in Lawrence, how can it (also) 
be a prison of abuse? Can it be? What about when, not if, in actuality, 
it is? 
Lawrence, which validates heterosexuality and trumpets its 
intimacies, elides these questions, and the realistic, if unflattering, 
portraits of heterosexuality's social life that precipitate them, not to 
mention the male supremacy that, in turn, produces them. The Court's 
opinion thus leads and leaves us to wonder: does the upbeat analogy 
between homosexuality and heterosexuality it embraces, hence the 
right to sexual intimacy to which it gives rise, suggest that 
homosexuality, like heterosexuality, can be ignored when it involves 
sexual injury?99 That it should be? That, after Lawrence, it will be?100 
Precisely these worries first surfaced in the course of the Lawrence 
litigation,101 triggered by the like-straight position lesbian and gay 
toward the defendant. Conversation with Joshua Dressler, Frank R. Strong Chair in Law, 
Michael E. Moritz College of Law (Aug., 19, 2004). 
99. Some estimate that the incidence of same-sex sexual violence, including domestic 
violence, approximates that of its cross-sex counterpart. See, e.g., NAT'L COALITION OF 
ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE IN 2001, at 2-3 (Rachel E. Baum & Clarence Patton eds., 2002) (offering such an 
estimate). Others speculate for various reasons, including gender, that "gay men's domestic 
violence may occur at a rate greater than domestic violence in the heterosexual community." 
DAVID ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LOVE THEM : 
BATTERED GAY MEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 14 (1991). It is too soon to provide a 
definitive, empirically-based assessment, in part, because "[o]fficial statistics on same-sex 
intimate partner violence are not available," and "[ o ]nly a handful of studies have examined 
the prevalence of intimate partner violence." Patricia Tjaden et al., Comparing Violence 
Over the Life Span in Samples of Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Cohabitants, 14 VIOLENCE & 
VICTIMS 413, 415 (1999). Existing studies, however, do provide support for the more modest 
suggestion that gay men are more likely victims of domestic violence than heterosexual men. 
The study that Tjaden and co-authors conducted, to give one example, "found that same-sex 
cohab[it]ants reported significantly more intimate partner violence than did opposite-sex 
cohabitants. For example, 23.l % of same-sex cohabiting men said they were raped and/or 
physically assaulted by a spouse or cohabiting partner at some time in their lives, compared 
with 7.7% of opposite-sex cohabiting men." Id. at 421. Accord Michael King et al., The 
Prevalence and Characteristics of Male Sexual Assault, in MALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL 
ASSAULT 1, 9 (Gillian C. Mezey & Michael B. King eds., 2000) ("Men who had had sex with 
men were six times more likely to suffer an assault as an adult."); id. at 12 ("Gay men are 
more likely than their straight counterparts to be assaulted and there is some evidence that 
sexual assaults against gay men may be a disguised form of 'queer bashing' in which sexual 
humiliation of gay men by (presumably) straight assailants is the principal aim." (citation 
omitted)); see also infra note 129. 
100. See, e.g. , Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1040-44 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
101. Well, actually, they preceded the Lawrence litigation. Institutionally speaking, the 
lesbian and gay communities, with the notable exception of the few lesbian and gay anti­
sexual-violence organizations within them, have persistently policed a closet around sexual 
abuse. The muted reactions of the leadership of the lesbian and gay communities to the 
sexualized murder of thirteen-year-old Jesse Dirkhising several years ago, for instance, was 
so notable that even Andrew Sullivan, hardly a sex-equality theorist, could not help but 
notice and comment on it, if chiefly to chastise the gay community's liberalism, including 
(from his perspective) the moral deformation produced by its "identity politics." Andrew 
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rights advocates invited the Court to adopt in the case, and what it 
implied for lesbian and gay victims of same-sex sexual abuse.102 
Disturbingly, while advancing their like-straight arguments and 
drawing attention to heterosexuality's glories, lesbian and gay rights 
advocates completely avoided any serious and engaged analysis of the 
existing problems of sexual abuse, whether cross-sex or same-sex, even 
when their realities were staring them right in the face. 
A number of lesbian and gay rights briefs, for instance, including 
the principal brief for the parties, cited approvingly - and not a single 
one criticized - the 1998 decision by the Georgia Supreme Court in 
Powell v. State,103 invalidating the state's sodomy law (the same law 
upheld in Hardwick) under the state constitution's privacy 
guarantee.104 The defendant, Anthony Powell, had been accused of 
Sullivan, Us and Them, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 2, 2001, at 8. Sullivan himself sought to 
distinguish the sexualized violence that led to Jesse Dirkhising's death as both extreme and 
aberrant. It was, he suggested, "the actions of [a] depraved [gay] couple." Id. In this way, 
Sullivan uncoupled the tragedy from other forms of sexual inequality. Elizabeth Birch, then­
Executive Director of the Human Rights Campaign, countered that: "the Human Rights 
Campaign . .. condemned the murder in news accounts when it occurred." Elizabeth Birch, 
Correspondence, NEW REPUBLIC, May 14, 2001, at 6; see Joyce Howard Price, Media Tune 
Out Torture Death of Arkansas Boy: Homosexual Charged with Rape, Murder, WASH. TIMES 
Oct. 22, 1999, at Al; David M. Smith, Letters, Times Prints 'Disgusting' Front-Page Article 
on Gays, WASH. nMES., Oct. 28, 1999, at A22. Birch's letter "categorically reject[ed] . . .  the 
notion that pedophilia is an inherent part of gay culture, values, or behavior," and declared 
that " [t]he abuse and exploitation of any child should be uniformly condemned, regardless of 
the sexual orientation of the perpetrator." Birch, supra. Having thus reconstructed 
Dirkhising's sexualized murder as a not-gay phenomenon, notwithstanding suggestions in 
press accounts, including Sullivan's, see Sullivan, supra, that Jesse Dirkhising himself may 
have been gay, Birch's letter avoids acknowledging any problem of sexual violence within 
the communities the Human Rights Campaign represents. A not entirely dissimilar move can 
be found in the Brief that the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund filed in Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. , 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Brief of Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568). I have discussed other, praiseworthy 
dimensions of this brief elsewhere. See Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 20-21 nn.59-60 (2004) [hereinafter Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic]. 
102 See Marc Spindelman Sodomy Politics in Lawrence v. Texas, JURIST, June 12, 2003, 
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnewll5.php. 
103. 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). 
104. The principal merits brief for Lawrence cited Powell approvingly. Brief of 
Petitioners at 23 n.17, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (citing Powell, 
among other legal developments, in a list of legal rules that repealed or invalidated "facially 
evenhanded sodomy laws since [Hardwick]"); id. at 24 (citing Powell, as an example of a 
"strong national consensus reflecting profound judgments about the limits of [the] 
government's intrusive powers in a civilized society," and as "another objective indicator of 
the fundamental rights at stake" in Lawrence). The lesbian and gay rights amicus briefs in 
Lawrence that also did include the Brief of the CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners at 26, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter CATO Brief) 
("State courts have been unimpressed with Hardwick's expansive view of the government's 
police power. Typical is Powell v. State . . . .  "); HRC Brief, supra note 36, at 21 (citing Powell 
as an illustration of the repeal or invalidation of sodomy laws after Hardwick); Brief of the 
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23, Lawrence, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (citing Powell in a series of state court judgments rejecting 
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having sex with his seventeen-year-old niece against her will. She 
testified at trial that the sex acts she engaged in with her uncle were 
forced, that she did not consent to them, and that during the encounter 
she wept, but otherwise "kept silent during the incident because she 
was afraid Powell would hurt her if she yelled."105 While this was 
happening, Powell's wife, the girl's aunt, who was then a month shy of 
delivering Powell's child, was asleep in the next room. 
When the Georgia high court announced its decision in Powell 
overturning both Powell's conviction and the law under which it was 
obtained, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund's Stephen 
Scarborough cheered.106 "This," he was quoted as saying, "is especially 
sweet."107 It "really sends the signal to other states [that] may be 
considering similar challenges that we are in a day and age where the 
government simply does not belong in bedrooms. "108 Whoever else 
may have found the Georgia court's decision, with its invalidation of 
Powell's conviction, "especially sweet," it was not the seventeen-year­
old girl who maintained that Powell had violated her sexually. 
Tracing a like-straight line on sexual violence without ever 
commenting on it, some of the lesbian and gay rights briefs in 
Hardwick as "inconsistent with rule-of-law norms"); Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, 
supra note 25, at 12 n.6 (commenting on the difference between Texas's same-sex sodomy 
prohibition and what was, before Powell, Georgia's generalized prohibition against sodomy, 
and noting that Powell struck down Georgia's sodomy prohibition, which has not since been 
reinstated); ACLU Brief, supra note 36, at 22 ("Recent state court decisions striking down 
sodomy laws reflect the social consensus that the state should not intrude into the most 
intimate of personal decisions in the home. See, e.g., . . .  Powell v. State . . . .  "); id. at 27 n.51 
(mentioning Powell as an illustration of legal trends). As an aside, the Court's Lawrence 
opinion does not miss the symbolic significance of Powell, and cites it with approval to 
support its position that legal (and cultural) norms about sodomy have changed in an 
ostensibly gay-friendly direction since Hardwick. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 ("The courts 
of five different States have declined to follow it in interpreting provisions in their own state 
constitutions parallel to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see . . .  
Powell v. State . . . .  "). 
105. Larry Hartstein, Sodomy Opinion Protested Force, Not Privacy, Called Issue in 
Case, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 24, 1998, at 1 ("[District Attorney Danny] Porter said the 
case wasn't about consenting adults but about a man assaulting a girl. He said the girl cried 
and kept silent during the incident because she was afraid Powell would hurt her if she 
yelled."). 
106. Lambda had filed an amicus brief in the case urging the Georgia Supreme Court to 
overturn Powell's conviction and the state's sodomy ban. Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. et al., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998) (No. 
S98A0755). Scarborough has written that the brief "argue[d] that the Georgia statute, which 
prohibits consensual conduct in a private home, cannot be reconciled with long-held 
concepts of personal privacy and human dignity." Stephen R. Scarborough, Georgia Man 
Gets Prison Term for Consensual Oral Sex, LAMBDA LEGAL, July 2, 1998, at http://www. 
lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=267 (on file with author). 
107. Kevin Sack, Georgia's High Court Voids Sodomy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, 
at A16. 
108. Id. 
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Lawrence also endorsed People v. Onofre,1[1} a 1980 decision by the 
New York State Court of Appeals overturning the state's sodomy ban 
on both privacy and equality grounds.110 Integral to the Onofre 
decision was the court's conclusion that the sex that the thirty­
something Ronald Onofre had had with seventeen-year-old Russell 
Evans was consensual. The sexual acts for which Onofre was initially 
convicted came to police attention when Evans told them what he and 
Onofre had done together.m Evans explained that he hoped that, by 
telling his story to the police, Onofre might be kept from similarly 
injuring others through sex.112 Among other things, Evans told the 
police: " [M]y anus was bothering me and I even at one point went to a 
doctor . . .  and got treatment because my rearend was tore up. "1 13 
Initially, Onofre, a self-described "minister[] and assembler,"114 
sought to help Evans, who was experiencing family problems. us "I 
have even tried to get full custody of him,"116 Onofre said. At some 
109. 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980). The lesbian and gay rights briefs in Lawrence that cited 
Onofre with approval, in addition to Lawrence's Reply Brief, Reply Brief at 9, Lawrence, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (citing Onofre along with other state court decisions that 
"struck down their sodomy laws (or narrowly construed them not to apply to private 
consensual conduct) in light of the laws' invasion of a realm that belongs to individuals, not 
the State"), include the Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 14-15, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Institute for 
Justice Brief] ("Cf People v. Onofre (holding that law prohibiting sodomy by any unmarried 
persons did not advance public morality and instead 'imposed a concept of private morality 
chosen by the State')." (citation omitted)); ACLU Brief, supra note 36, at 14 n.18 (describing 
Onofre as a case that "involved private consensual conduct."); CATO Brief, supra note 104, 
at 8 ("(S]ome state courts ruled that consensual sodomy laws violate the Due Process Clause. 
E.g., People v. Onofre . . . .  ") . For two critical views on Onofre, see CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 1090-92 (2001), and RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A 
STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 52 (1988). Mohr describes Onofre as "(a] successful 
attempt to overturn New York's sodomy law (that] was occasioned by an odd series of events 
in which a grand jury indictment for the raping of a child was basically reconstructed by the 
district attorney and judge into a charge of sex between consenting adults." Id. The facts of 
the case are, he  writes, "contorted, peculiar, but undisputed." Id. at 52 n.1 1 .  
110. See Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 940-43. The Onofre court explained that: 
Personal feelings of distaste for the conduct sought to be proscribed . . .  and even disapproval 
by a majority of the populace, if that disapproval were to be assumed, may not substitute for 
the required demonstration of a valid basis for intrusion by the State in an area of important 
personal decision protected under the right of privacy drawn from the United States 
Constitution - areas, the number and definition of which have steadily grown but, as the 
Supreme Court has observed, the outer limits of which it has not yet marked. 
Id. at 941-42; see also id. at 943 ("The statute therefore must fall as violative of the right to 
equal protection enjoyed by persons not married to each other."). 
111 .  Affidavit of Russell Evans, Sept. 6, 1977 (on file with author). 
1 12. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Voluntary Affidavit of Ronald E. Onofre, Feb. 23, 1977 (on file with author). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
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point, Onofre told the authorities, " [b]efore I knew what was 
happening, things started happening between us."117 (So much for 
sexual "choice.") Although both Onofre and Evans eventually agreed 
that the relationship, including the sex, was consensual, Onofre 
reflected in writing to the police that: 
I know Russell to be a d eeply emotionally d isturbed boy who is i[n] need 
of tend er loving c are and attention. To the best of my ability, this is what 
I have tried to provid e f or Russell. Russell knows that I am gay, so h[ e] 
may have thought to repay me f or my kind ness, that he had to have an 
intimate relationship with me.118 
Plenty is amiss here, including a range of inequalities - of age, of 
emotional vulnerability, of social position, to mention a few - in 
addition to abuses of power, as well as the physical harms. How then, 
did Onofre become a symbol for gay rights? The answer is that the sex 
in Onofre was consensual (we know this because they both said so), 
and that Onofre protected sexual rights. Never mind that the 
"consent" in Onofre was stacked on top of inequalities and abuses of 
power. Never mind that Onofre's respect for sexual freedom was 
achieved on the back of the multiple sexual injuries to the less 
powerful person that the sex it protected involved.119 
Powell and Onofre and their reappearance in the Lawrence 
litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court underscored the urgency of 
determining exactly what the lesbian and gay rights briefs in the case 
implied when they maintained that lesbians and gay men were "just 
like" heterosexuals. Did their like-straight arguments indicate to the 
Court that lesbians and gay men, like heterosexuals, did not and would 
not take claims of sexual abuse seriously? That gays, like 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. The amicus brief filed in Bowers v. Hardwick by the Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Inc., both for itself and for the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, 
the Bar Association for Human Rights of Greater New York, the Massachusetts Lesbian and 
Gay Bar Association, and the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, Inc., Amicus 
Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Respondents by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Inc. et al., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140), did not. It repeatedly cited 
Onofre with approval. Id. at 6, 10 n.8, 11 ,  23 & n.20, 24. At one point, the Brief relied on 
Onofre to help rebut the "myths which seek to link homosexuality with child molestation, 
health threats, public lewdness, and so on." Id. at 23 n.20. " [H)aving reviewed the record and 
considered actual evidence," the Brief claimed, the Onofre court (like the court in another 
decision) "found that the state could [not) show the . . .  statute[) in question served any valid 
interest." Id. Indeed, on the very next page, the Brief went on to maintain that: "The Onofre 
court found that the state had failed to demonstrate how statutes such as Georgia's 
[meaning: sodomy statutes) 'serve to advance the cause of public morality or do anything 
other than restrict individual conduct and impose a concept of private morality chosen by the 
[s)tate."' Id. at 24 (quoting Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 489-90). Presumably, the Lambda Brief 
offered these thoughts on Onofre only after "review[ing] the record and consider[ing] actual 
evidence [in the case)." Id. at 23 n.20. How it could if, in fact, it did, the Lambda Brief, did 
not pause to say. 
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heterosexuals, would celebrate relations of unequal power between 
sexual partners? Were the lesbian and gay rights briefs telling the 
Court that lesbians and gay men, like heterosexuals, would regard any 
victory for sex in Lawrence as sweet - even if that meant that the sex 
that would be protected by the Court's ruling was - or included -
sexual violation ?120 
Beyond the predictable platitudes about "consent" interspersed 
throughout the lesbian and gay rights briefs in Lawrence121 -
120. This is not to suggest, as I make clear later on, that the sex Lawrence and Garner 
had was - or included - sexual violation. Neither made such a claim in the case. But cf 
Bruce Nichols, "We Never Chose to Be Public Figures": Houston Men Were Surrounded By 
Secrecy Throughout Appeal, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 2003, at 19A; Lisa Teachey, 
Defendant in Sodomy Case Out of Jail After Assault Charges Dismissed, HOUSTON CHRON., 
Nov. 25, 1998, at A23. For a post-Lawrence illustration of the gay community's support for 
hierarchical sex in a case in which it was alleged as fact that at least some of the sex at issue 
was nonconsensual, as well as unwanted, see Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant 
on Behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union et al., United States v. Marcum, 69 M.J. 198 
(C.A.A.F. 2004) (No. 02-0944). 
121. To mention a few examples of the many more that can be found in these briefs, see 
Brief of Petitioners at 13-14, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) ("[T]he 
physical, bodily dimensions of how two persons express their sexuality in intimate relations 
are profoundly personal. Indeed, consent is a critically important dividing line in legal and 
societal views about sexuality for the very reason that individual control over sexual activity 
is of fundamental importance to every person's autonomy."); CATO Brief, supra note 104, 
at 11 ("Indeed, a man could not be convicted of sodomy based upon the testimony of a 
sexual partner who was his 'accomplice'; conversely, the partner's testimony was admissible 
if she or he were an unwilling participant or a minor (incapable of giving consent). This well­
established proof requirement created an immunity for sodomy within the home between 
consenting adults."); Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 109, at 14 ("There is a crucial 
difference, however, between promoting public morality and protecting the sensibilities of 
reasonable members of the community while in the public sphere - something that falls 
under the police power of state - and criminalizing private consensual conduct that harms 
neither the individuals involved nor the general public - something that is outside the 
bounds of the police power."); id. at 14 ("The State's power to promote public virtue and 
govern conduct in public spaces ends when individuals conduct their private lives behind 
closed doors in ways that harm no one."); HRC Brief, supra note 36, at 2 ("We think it 
manifestly clear that Texas' sodomy law infringes on a fundamental right shared by the 
entire community - the right to be free from governmental intrusion into, and 
criminalization of, private sexual relations between consenting adults."); ACLU Brief, supra 
note 36, at 2 (arguing that the Court "should hold that the Due Process Clause . . .  protects 
the liberty of consenting adults to decide what sexual intimacies they will share in private"); 
id. at 4 ("The Court's privacy cases recognize a fundamental right on the part of consenting 
adults to form and conduct intimate personal relationships within the protective shelter of 
the home."); id. at 12 ("(A] thorough review of American history shows that, at least since 
the Revolution, Americans have believed that government has no place in the bedrooms of 
consenting adults."); id. at 13 ("From as early as the post-Revolutionary period, states have 
very rarely applied laws banning sodomy, fornication, or adultery to consenting adults in 
private."); id. at 25 ("Our nation's history and tradition thus show . . .  a longstanding, 
virtually universal refusal to apply sodomy laws to private, consensual conduct by adults - a 
deliberate policy [reflecting] . . .  [the] conviction that government has no business dictating 
to consenting adults what sexual intimacies they may have in private."). But see, e.g. , ACLU 
Brief, supra note 36, at 13 ("More critically, sodomy laws have almost always been applied in 
cases involving children, the use of force, public sex, or prostitution."); id. at 15 n.20 
("Prosecutions for sodomy today are almost entirely limited to either sexual conduct in a 
public place . . .  or sexual conduct involving force or lack of consent where a sexual assault 
charge would be difficult to prove." (alteration in original) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER & 
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platitudes incapable on their own of addressing, much less resolving, 
the inequality problems in cases like Powell and Onofre - the briefs 
had nothing purposeful to say about the contemporary problems of 
sexual violence among lesbians and gay men. Not even the 
"international law" brief in Lawrence did,122 though this is a problem 
that transcends borders.123 
One of the few briefs supporting Lawrence and Garner that, 
however remotely, crafted an argument for lesbian and gay rights 
around same-sex sexual violence as such was the brief that William 
Eskridge wrote for the CATO Institute. (Its influence on the Court's 
analysis of sodomy laws' history at least appears to be not 
insubstantial.124) The CATO Brief submitted that in the nineteenth 
century, sodomy laws were partly an attempt to address same-sex 
sexual abuse.125 This, the Brief explained, stood in contrast to modern 
sodomy laws, which - until Lawrence declared them unconstitutional 
KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 66 (1998))); Brief Amici 
Curiae of Mary Robinson, supra note 57, at 16 ("[T]hree limiting principles [harm, consent, 
and commerce] can be found in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
In Laskey, laggard & Brown v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (1997), . . .  the Court 
emphasized the harm principle in declining to extend Dudgeon to protect consensual, sado­
masochistic sexual activity in the home. The Laskey Court stressed 'that not every sexual 
activity carried out behind closed doors necessarily falls within the scope of Article 8' 
privacy."). 
122. See supra note 121. 
123. See, e.g., King et al., supra note 99, at 5 ("A British study of 930 gay male 
volunteers reported that just over a quarter had been 'subjected to sex without . . .  consent' 
and that 99 of these men had been raped." (alteration in original) (quoting Ford C.I. 
Hickson et al, Gay Men as Victims of Nonconsensual Sex, 23 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 
281 (1994))); Lee Vickers, The Second Closet: Domestic Violence in Lesbian and Gay 
Relationships: A Western Australian Perspective, 3 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. 'II 2 
(1996) ("Whilst media attention on the [Western Australia] case focused exclusively on the 
use of the 'battered wife syndrome' . . .  the case importantly draws attention to the little 
discussed problem of domestic or intimate violence in same sex relationships." (footnote 
omitted)); Mark Levy, Male Rape 'Impossible' In South Africa, 365GA Y.COM NEWSCENTER, 
Aug. 11 ,  2003 (on file with author) ("Professor Divya Singh, executive director of police 
practice at Technikon Southern Africa in Pretoria, says the general attitude to male rape is 
largely disbelief, blame and mockery."); The Domestic Violence Officer - a vital role, BBC, 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/threecounties/read_this/hitting_home/dvlo.shtml (last visited Sept. 9, 
2004) ("If we had more publicity and more resources available such as a male refuge, it 
would encourage more [male victims] to come forward. To my knowledge there's still not a 
refuge for men in this country." (quoting Domestic Violence Liaison Officer Graham 
Pearson)). 
124. The Court, for example, endorses the CATO Briefs suggestion that, historically, 
sodomy laws supplemented rape laws as a means of addressing sexual abuse. Compare 
CATO Brief, supra note 104, at 9-12, with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-71.  Another example of 
the CATO Briefs influence on the Court can be found by comparing the CATO Brief, supra 
note 104, at 15, with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-73. 
125. CATO Brief, supra note 104, at 11 ("A second, and in practice the primary, 
purpose of nineteenth century sodomy laws was protection of children, women, and weaker 
men against sexual assault."). 
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- were grounded in homophobia.126 Unnoticed in the CATO Brief, 
unfortunately, was the possibility that this historical purpose may have 
been implicated in some recent sodomy cases, including Powell and 
Onofre, both of which it mentioned approvingly.121 The other briefs in 
Lawrence that repeated the CATO Brief's historical claims did not 
notice the possibility either.128 From aught that appears in the lesbian 
and gay rights briefs filed in Lawrence, one could easily, if mistakenly, 
believe that inside the lesbian and gay communities there is only ever 
sex, never sexual abuse.129 
126. To be clear, the word "homophobia" does not itself appear anywhere in the CA TO 
Brief. But its discussion of how sodomy laws came to target homosexuals in the twentieth 
century, and its evident disapproval of that targeting, makes the point plainly enough. See id. 
at 13-17. But see RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO 
AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 66 (1996) (maintaining that "(p]rosecutions for sodomy are today 
almost entirely limited either to sexual conduct in a public place . . . or sexual conduct 
involving force or lack of consent, where a sexual assault charge would be difficult to 
prove"); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1894, 1896 n.11 (2004) (taking note of the "fairly 
common" practice "prior to Lawrence's invalidation of all statutes prohibiting consensual 
sodomy, of using consensual sodomy in charge bargaining - that is, of charging defendants 
prosecuted for forcible rape or sexual assault with consensual sodomy, to which they might 
plead guilty in exchange for a prosecutor's agreement to drop the more serious charge rather 
than to make the uphill attempt to prove absence of consent," but putting it aside as 
"(i]rrelevant" for purposes of analyzing the decision). 
127. Also unnoticed in the CATO Brief are the possible applications of Eskridge's own 
independent observations about the limits of sexual consent. Describing the idea that 
"consent is negated by physical coercion or threats of coercion" as rape law's "core concept," 
he has proposed expanding that concept to "consider other forms of coercion" - what he 
has described as "undue pressure." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual 
Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 47, 66 (1995). Within this approach, "conceptions of 
status [would] reenter the policy calculus - not to render consent irrelevant, but instead to 
consider whether apparent consent ('yes') has been rendered meaningfully." Id. "In 
situations in which one party stands in a position of authority or power over the other party, 
the latter's acquiescence in sexual relations might be doubted and more easily negated." Id. 
at 66-67 (footnote omitted). To clarify, Eskdrige added in a footnote that he was "thinking 
specifically about employer-employee, minister/rabbi/priest-religious observant, guardian­
ward, psychiatrist/doctor-patient, or teacher-student relationships." Id. at 67 n.57. What light 
this may shed on the CATO Brief's treatment of Onofre has yet to be explained, as does why 
Eskridge chose on his own behalf to close off his list at the point he did, rather than opening 
it up to other status-based, hierarchical relationships, gender itself, of course, being one, like 
class and age and race. See, e.g. , Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Querying Lawrence, 65 OHIO 
ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author) (Of Lawrence and Garner: "Their potential 
disparity - based on race, class, age, and perhaps gender expression - provides grounds to 
inquire about the existence of consent - an element the majority assumes (but would be 
irrelevant to the dissent)."). 
128. Nor, for that matter, does the Court's opinion in Lawrence, which recognizes the 
ideas in the CATO Brief. See supra note 124; cf MOHR, supra note 109, at 51 n.9 ("In the 
nation's capital, for instance . . .  there are no laws that particularly address the problem of 
males raping males. The (rape] statute defines rapes as involving only female victims. D.C. 
Code Ann. sect. 23-3502 (1981). Thus sodomy laws are used to fill this breach of the legal 
imagination. Male victims are left to plead necessity."). 
129. As if sex, structured the way that it predominantly is under existing social 
conditions, could so easily and so neatly be dissociated from sexual abuse. The fantasy that 
sexual violence within the lesbian and gay communities at large tends to an empty set - and 
it is a fantasy, see supra note.99 - is one to which many cling. Richard Posner, for example, 
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Lesbian and gay rights advocates did not only suggest the non­
existence of sexual violence within the lesbian and gay communities 
tacitly. During the oral arguments in Lawrence, Justice Antonin Scalia 
pressed Paul Smith, Lambda's representative before the Court,130 on 
the implications of the like-straight principle he was advancing. Justice 
Scalia asked Smith: "What about rape laws? There are . . . rape 
laws . . .  that only apply to . . . male/female rape . . . . [Are they] 
unconstitutional?"rn "Suppose the State has a rape law that - that, 
you know, that really requires the penetration of the female sex organ 
by - which is the classic common-law definition . . .  of rape, and it has 
no law of . . . homosexual rape. You think that that law would be 
unconstitutional?"132 
This was a perfect opportunity to acknowledge that yes, gays, just 
like heterosexuals, have a problem of sexual violence, and to say, yes, 
laws that do not offer meaningful and equal protection to lesbians and 
gay men, as well as heterosexuals, from sexual abuse should be 
declared unconstitutional. Indeed, Smith might have reminded the 
Court that under Texas law, men and women, straight and gay, were 
already at least formally protected against acts of sexual assault, and 
that many states had "gender-neutralized" their rape laws.133 The 
has suggested that "rape of either men or women by women is exceedingly rare, as is male 
homosexual rape outside of prisons." RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 383 (1992). 
His sole citation for this proposition is PAUL H. GEBHARD ET AL., SEX OFFENDERS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF TYPES 791 (1965). (Just a page later, Posner again relied on Gebhard, this time 
for the proposition that "resort to force in male homosexual encounters" is "infrequen[t]." 
POSNER, supra, at 384 (citing GEBHARD, supra, at 791).) Some years ago, Richard Mohr 
sounded a similar note, commenting that: "It used to be that external sexual relations were 
the typical venting mechanism for pressures and tensions in male relations. Gay males have 
never had much of a problem with spousal battering - but such venting is now deadly." 
MOHR, supra note 109, at 237 (emphasis added). Susan Estrich was undoubtedly on to 
something where she remarked that: "[t]he apparent invisibility of the problem of male rape, 
at least outside the prison context, may well reflect the intensity of the stigma attached to the 
. . .  homophobic reactions against its gay victims." Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 1087, 
1089 n.l (1986). A useful, if brief, discussion of these matters, including a few additional 
sources on prevalence, can be found in Deborah W. Denno et al., Panel Discussion, Men, 
Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 125-38 (1994) (introductory remarks of the 
moderator, Deborah W. Denno). 
130. In a technical sense, Smith served as Lawrence's and Powell's lawyer, but of course, 
he was also representing Lambda, in the name of the lesbian and gay communities. For 
literature bearing on these and related representational issues, see, for example, Janet E.  
Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation, in THE 
POLITICS OF LA w: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); William 
B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and 
Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997); William B. Rubenstein, In 
Communities Begin Responsibilities: Obligations at the Gay Bar, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1101 
(1997). 
131. Oral Argument at 15 (Mar. 26, 2003), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 
02-102) [hereinafter Lawrence Oral Argument]. 
132. Id. at 16. 
133. Jurisdictions that have include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (Michie 2002), 
Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1401, -1406 (West 2001), Arkansas, ARK. CODE 
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ANN. §§ 5-14-101, -103 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003), Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-
401 to -402 (2003), Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-65, -70 (West 2001 & Supp. 
2004), Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 ,  §§ 761, 773 (2001), the District of Columbia, D.C. 
CODE ANN. §§ 22-3001 to -3002 (2001 & Supp. 2004), Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2004), Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-700, -730 (1993 & Supp. 2003) ,  
Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-12 to -13 (2003), Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 702.17, 709.1 
(West 2003), Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:41, :42 to :43 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004), 
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 251, 253 (West Supp. 2003), Massachusetts, MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (Law. Co-op. 2002), Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
750.520a-.520b (West 1991 & Supp. 2004), Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.341-.342 
(West 2003), Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-95 to -97 (2000), Montana, MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 45-2-101, 45-5-502 to -503 (2003), Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-318 to -
319 (Michie 2003), Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.364-.366 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003), 
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:l  to :2 (Supp. 2003) ,  New Jersey, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-1 to -2 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004), New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
9-1 1 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 2003), North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-02 to -03 
(1997), Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01-.02 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003), Oklahoma, 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111  (West 2002), Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
3101,  3121 (West 2000), Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 1 1-37-1 to -2 (2002), South 
Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651 to -652 (Law. Co-op. 2003), South Dakota, S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-1 to -2 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2003) ,  Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 39-13-501 to -503 (2003), Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 
2004-2005), Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3251-3252 (1998), Washington, WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.010, .040 (West 2000), West Virginia, w. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1, -
3 (Michie 2000), Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003), and 
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-301 to -302 (Michie 2003). 
Those that have not include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (Supp. 2003) (rape in the 
first degree is opposite-sex sex crime), Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (2003) (rape is 
offense perpetrated by men against women by use of "male sex organ"), Idaho, IDAHO 
CODE § 18-6101 (Michie 2004) (rape is offense "accomplished with a female" by male, using 
penis), Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. 35-42-4-1 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (rape is cross-sex 
crime), Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3501 to -3502 (1995 & Supp. 2003) (rape requires 
"sexual intercourse," defined as "any penetration [however slight] of the female sex organ by 
a finger, the male sex organ or any object"), Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.010, 
.040 (Michie 1999), Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LA w § 3-303 (2002 & Supp. 
2003) (rape requires "vaginal intercourse"), Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 566.010, .030 (2000 
& Supp. 2003) (rape requires "sexual intercourse," defined as "penetration, however slight, 
of the female sex organ by the male sex organ"), New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.00, .25-
.35 (McKinney 2004) (rape, including to the third degree, requires "sexual intercourse," 
which "has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight"), North 
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2 to .3 (2003) (rape - both first and second degree -
requires "vaginal intercourse"), and Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.305, .355-.375 (2003) 
(rape entails "sexual intercourse," which "has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any 
penetration, however slight"). 
In California, Utah, and Virginia, rape is defined in statutory language broad enough to 
be described as "gender neutral," CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261, 286, 288a, 289 (West 1999 & 
Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 to -407 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61, -67.1, 
to -67.4 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2004), but the highest court in each jurisdiction has 
supplemented that language in such a way as (to appear) to make rape a cross-sex crime. See 
People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213, 250 (Cal. 1997) (holding that "sexual intercourse" "require[s] 
vaginal penetration"); State v. Simmons, 759 P.2d 1152, 1 154 (Utah 1988) ("(P]enetration" 
involves "entry between the outer folds of the labia."); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 
539, 549 (Va. 1984) ("To prove rape, the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that an accused has had sexual intercourse with a female by force and against her will."), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1096 (1985), aff d on remand, 334 S.E.2d 
838 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); Carter v. Commonwealth, 428 S.E.2d 34, 41 
(Va. App. 1993) ("To prove that sexual intercourse occurred, the evidence must establish 
that 'there has been an actual penetration to some extent of the male sexual organ into the 
female sexual organ.'") (quoting Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1989), cert. 
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Lambda Brief in Lawrence that Smith signed, after all, had made 
direct (albeit passing) reference to Texas's sexual assault law, one of 
only two lesbian and gay rights briefs in Lawrence to do so.134 (None of 
the published opinions in Lawrence makes any mention of this law at 
all.) To bear out this point, Smith might have invoked Justice Scalia's 
opinion for the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc.,135 which extended sex-equality protections to male victims of 
sexual abuse, thus casting doubt on sex-differentiated and sexual­
orientation-differentiated protections against it.136 "This is a lesson that 
you, Justice Scalia, taught us on the Court's behalf in Oncale," Smith 
could easily have said. 
Alternatively, Smith might have responded to Justice Scalia's 
question with reference to Limon v. Kansas,131 a case that the Supreme 
Court was holding at the time of the oral arguments in Lawrence, 
which had reached the Court even before Lawrence did, by pointing to 
the difficulties that can arise for lesbians and gay men when same-sex 
sexual abuse is not treated the same as its cross-sex counterpart. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1036, (1990) (quoting Tuggle, 323 S.E.2d at 549)). Nothing here is meant to 
suggest that, in those jurisdictions that have not gender-neutralized their rape laws, same-sex 
rape is not a crime. 
134. The other direct reference in the lesbian and gay rights briefs in Lawrence to 
Texas's law against sexual assault appears in a footnote in the Law Professors' Brief. See 
Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 25, at 20 n.10 (observing that Texas's 
sexual assault law, like the state's ban on public sex and its ban on sex with minors, applies 
"to heterosexual and homosexual conduct alike"). Needless to say, this is hardly an analysis 
of how that law has operated in practice or how the acts it addresses are related to sex 
inequality. 
135. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). For my reading of Oncale, see Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 
supra note 101. 
136. See, e.g. , Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(Nelson, J., dissenting) ("While gay-baiting insults and teasing are not actionable under Title 
VII, a line is crossed when the abuse is physical and sexual."). Judge Nelson added: 
Rene has alleged that his attackers shoved their fingers into his anus and grabbed at his 
genitals. If his attackers were women or if they were gay men - or if Rene were a lesbian 
attacked by straight men - there is no question that the plaintiff's openly gay status would 
not be a complete defense to his Title VII claim. Nor would sexual orientation provide a 
defense for a gay male who harasses a female employee. That Rene's attackers were 
ostensibly heterosexual men is no basis for a different outcome - the attack was 
homosexual in nature, and his case involves allegations of sexual abuse that female 
employees did not have to endure. Rene's attackers may have targeted him for sexual 
pleasure, as an outlet for rage, as a means of affirming their own heterosexuality, or any 
combination of a myriad of factors, the determination of which falls far beyond the 
competence of any court. The effect was to humiliate Rene as a man. Enforcing Title VII in 
the mixed-gender context does not involve determining which pleasure center in the 
attackers' brains was stimulated by the attacks, nor should it in this case. 
Id. at 1211-12. Judge Nelson's conclusion was vindicated by an en bane panel of the Ninth 
Circuit in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane). Not all 
courts have recognized the doubt that Oncale heaps on the contrary view - a view that 
Lawrence's like-straight reasoning could likewise, as a principle, be understood to disaffirm. 
137. State v. Limon, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002), aff d State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2004). 
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Limon, as Smith undoubtedly knew,138 involved a constitutional 
challenge to Kansas's statutory rape regime by a developmentally 
disabled defendant who, prior to the conviction at issue in Limon, had 
twice been convicted as a teen of aggravated sodomy for the sex he 
had with younger boys. With the support of the lesbian and gay 
communities as amici, Limon urged the Court to set his conviction 
aside, in part, because the Kansas law that provided for it did not treat 
homosexuality and heterosexuality alike. Limon's sentence was much, 
much more severe than it otherwise would have been - only because 
he and M.A.R., the developmentally disabled, younger boy with whom 
Limon admitted having sex, were of the same sex. Central to the 
Kansas Court of Appeals' initial decision upholding Limon's 
conviction and sentence, since reaffirmed,139 was a flat-footed rejection 
of the idea that homosexuality and heterosexuality were, 
constitutionally speaking, alike, hence that same-sex statutory rape 
should be treated in just the same way as cross-sex statutory rape was 
under state law. For doctrinal support, the Kansas court invoked and 
relied on the authority of Bowers v. Hardwick.140 Smith could have 
said, "our like-straight argument does not admit of such results. Sexual 
violence is sexual violence irrespective of the sex and sexual 
orientation of the perpetrator and the victim. There is no good 
justification for not treating them the same." 
Or Smith might have returned Justice Scalia's volley by asking, 
"What, exactly, Justice Scalia, do you mean by 'homosexual rape'? 
Same-sex sexual assault generally? Same-sex sexual assault committed 
by straight men? Against them? Is 'homosexual rape' only rape that is 
committed by 'provably' or out gay men? Does it refer to a form of 
sexual violence that, socially speaking, can make a heterosexual victim 
wonder whether he is, or might be, gay? Does the term construe any 
man who sexually assaults another man as 'homosexual' by 
definition?141 Does it make same-sex rape a crime that only gay men 
138. One of the amici in Limon - DKT Liberty Project - was (and is) represented in 
the litigation by lawyers at Jenner & Block's Washington, D.C. office, where Smith is a 
senior partner. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The DKT Liberty Project in Support of 
Appellant, Limon v. Kansas, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 00-85898-A). 
139. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). The Kansas appeals court does 
not persuasively reconcile its reaffirmation of Limon's conviction with Lawrence's like­
straight reasoning, much less its declaration that majoritarian morality simpliciter is not an 
adequate constitutional justification for laws regulating consensual sex. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 577-78; id. at 582-83, 584 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The dissenting opinion of Judge 
Pierron in Limon offers a more faithful reading of Lawrence. Limon, 83 P.3d at 243 (Pierron, 
J., dissenting). 
140. State v. Limon, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
141. Examples of such homophobic thinking are numerous. See, e.g. , Editorial, Media 
Have Two Standards on Crimes Involving Gays, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Jan. 28, 2000, 
at A12 ("[I)f the two men [responsible for Jesse Dirkhising's death, see supra note 101) had 
not been homosexuals, they would not have raped a 13-year-old boy."). 
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commit? Is there any room in the notion of 'homosexual rape' for 
lesbian women at all?" 
What Smith said instead was: "I didn't suggest that [laws 
prohibiting only male-on-female rape are] unconstitutional."142 The 
reason Smith offered to shore up his view was this: A State might 
justify a law that prohibited only male-on-female rape by coming 
forward with evidence that "homosexual rape" "is not a problem that 
needs to be addressed or that the victims are more able to protect 
themselves."143 To repeat the relevant point: A State may justifiably 
choose not to regulate so-called "homosexual rape," either because 
there is "evidence that this is not a problem that needs to be addressed 
or that the victims [ - presumably men, including gay men - ] are 
more able to protect themselves."144 
But what about gay victims of "homosexual rape," the very people 
who, among others, have not, by definition, been able to protect 
themselves? Should we maybe believe that they wanted it, so they 
were not raped?145 That they were sexually actualized by it? How 
circular, providing evidence that same-sex rape is "not a problem that 
needs to be addressed."146 If one believes that men "are more able to 
142. Lawrence Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 15. 
143. Id. at 16. As for the idea that victims of same-sex sexual abuse are better able to 
protect themselves, it is powerfully belied by the facts. See, e.g., Anthony Glassman, Man 
Gets Ten Years for Kidnapping Akron Student, GAY PEOPLE'S CHRON., Mar. 19, 2004, at 4 
(reporting on the conviction of Patrick C. Geiger for the abduction, kidnapping, and felony 
assault - but not the rape - of the University of Akron student, and observing that one 
juror explained the non-conviction for rape on the grounds that it was believed that "the sex 
was consensual but became violent"); Eric Resnick, Man Says Akron Police Move Too 
Slowly on Male Rape, GAY PEOPLE'S CHRON., Sept. 5, 2003 (detailing the documented 
physical violence that punctuated the alleged rape of a thirty-four-year-old University of 
Akron student); see also Eric Resnick, Police Arrest Suspect in Rape of Akron Student, GAY 
PEOPLE'S CHRON., Oct. 10, 2003, at 3. Other reports on this case include: Carl Chancellor, 
Kidnapper Guilty in Assault of Man, AKRON BEACON J., Mar. 13, 2004, at Bl (describing the 
victim in the case as having "escaped" "half-naked" "from Geiger's apartment" and the 
assistance provided by "another tenant in the building, who called police"); Ed Meyer, HIV­
Positive Rape Suspect in Custody, AKRON BEACON J., Feb. 25, 2004, at Al; Ed Meyer, Man 
Wrongly Released Back in Police Custody, AKRON BEACON J., Feb. 24, 2004, available at 
2004 WL 56254342; Phil Texler & Ed Meyer, HIV Rape Suspect Set Free by Error, AKRON 
BEACON J., Feb. 24, 2004, at Al; Law and Order, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 17, 2004, at B3; Law 
and Order, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 13, 2004, at B3 ("The victim said there was no one else at 
the apartment and Geiger, who is HIV-positive, forced him to have sex, then beat him and 
choked him. Geiger said the sex was consensual and the victim knew that Geiger carried the 
virus that causes AIDS. The jury acquitted Geiger of rape."). For several first-hand accounts 
of same-sex rape that similarly rebut it, see, for example, SCARCE, supra note 98, at xiii-xvii; 
Funk, supra note 98, at 221-22; Christopher B. Smith, Survival, in SCARCE, supra note 98, at 
183, 183-195 (describing rape and aftermath). 
144. Lawrence Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 16. 
145. Cindy Struckman-Johnson & David Struckman-Johnson, Acceptance of Male Rape 
Myths Among College Men and Women, 27 SEX ROLES 85, 87 (1992) ("Some male victims -
especially gay men - are made to feel that they 'asked for' the rape by their own indiscreet 
or risky behavior." (citation omitted)). 
146. Lawrence Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 16. 
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protect themselves,"147 and so is willing to disbelieve men's claims of 
rape when they have not, the problems of same-sex sexual violence 
disappear. All men, gay or straight, are apparently alike: sexually 
inviolable and unviolated.148 
Leaving aside how Smith's remark naturalized, hence justified, 
male sexual aggression, and how it reinforced the notion that women 
are defined by their capacity to be sexually violated by men,149 
someone might have thought to ask Smith from the Bench, "why, if 
the like-straight analogy you are advocating is to be taken seriously, 
should cross-sex sexual violence be any different?" Nobody did. 
For some of us at least, the message that emerged from the 
Lawrence litigation, addressed directly to lesbian and gay victims of 
sexual abuse, was clear. It said: Lawrence is not for you; it is about 
unleashing and protecting what was done to you. In anticipation of the 
Court's decision in the case, the question was whether the Court 
would follow suit. How would the Court address the problems of 
same-sex sexual violence within the lesbian and gay communities? 
Would it, or would it ignore the problems altogether? 
Signs of what the Court has done - of how it has answered the 
questions - are found in various places in the Court's Lawrence 
opinion.150 But the most disconcerting indications of what the Court's 
view of same-sex sexual violence among lesbians and gay men is, 
emanate from the right to sexual intimacy Lawrence introduces. A 
sketch of that right, to explain, is thus a useful place to begin. 
From its opening paragraph, Lawrence makes clear that the 
substantive due process right to sexual intimacy it embraces is a 
quintessentially individual right: 
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions 
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and 
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant 
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an 
147. Id. 
148. See, e.g., ISLAND & LETELLIER, supra note 99, at 102-103 ("Given our socialization 
in American culture, it is expected, even 'natural, '  to see women as victims. . . . Men, 
however, according to our culture, are not victims, but victimizers: strong, tough, powerful, 
decision-making, self-reliant, and controlling. Men may be victimizers . . .  but not victims."). 
149. Cf Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) ("The employee's very 
womanhood would thus directly undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the 
essence of a correctional counselor's responsibility."). But see Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men, 3 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 449, 483 (1993) ("The victims of sex offenses are not limited to 
women. In addition, irrespective of the sex of the victims of sex offenses outside prison, men 
are routinely raped in prisons."). 
150. The Court's approving citation of Powell, Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576, without any 
discussion of its facts, and its avoidance of any reference to Texas's rape laws, offer 
independent reasons for hesitation. See also infra note 163. 
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autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the 
person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.151 
In the Court's view, all persons, without distinction, including any 
distinction along sexual-orientation lines, enjoy freedom in the social 
world, "autonomy of self," prior to state intervention. The principal 
threat to this freedom is "unwarranted government intrusions." 
Through its powers of regulation - including regulation over what the 
Court refers to as "certain intimate conduct," which is to say sex, in 
both "its spatial and more transcendent dimensions" - the State may 
vex, oppress, even occupy and define "lives and existence" themselves. 
To allow it to do so would be to allow the State to disrespect "liberty," 
hence mock freedom - or worse: destroy it altogether. 
Accordingly, the Court introduces the right to sexual intimacy, 
which is to serve as a bulwark against these unsavory possibilities. Its 
recognition, Lawrence explains, functions to guarantee that, "as a 
general rule," neither the State nor its courts, will be in a position to 
"attempt[] . . .  to define the meaning of [personal) relationship[s] or to 
set [their] boundaries. "152 
There are, to be sure, limited circumstances in which State 
intrusions into the sexual arena may not be "unwarranted"153: When 
there is, in the Court's words, "injury to a person or abuse of an 
institution the law protects."154 But these are exceptions to the 
"general rule" that the State is not to superintend sex. 
To police the boundaries of these exceptions, hence to check the 
State's dominion over sex, the Lawrence Court rules that the State and 
its courts must ordinarily treat sex as consensual absent proof it was 
not. As much as anything else, the Court issues this rule by its own 
example. During oral arguments in the case, Charles Rosenthal, Jr., 
for Texas, pointed out that the record the Court had before it 
contained no proof that Lawrence and Garner consented to the sex 
they were convicted under Texas law for having had. "[C)onsent may 
be alleged in this case," he remarked, "but consent is not proven in the 
record."155 Rosenthal's observation fell on deaf ears during his oral 
151. Id. at 562. 
152. Id. at 567. 
153. Id. at 562, 565 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). 
154. Id. at 567. 
155. Lawrence Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 35 (emphasis added); see also 
Respondent's Brief, at 6 n.7, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) ("While neither of 
the petitioners was charged with any variant of sexual assault, prosecution for such an 
offense would require an acknowledgment from at least one of the parties that the sexual 
activity was non-consensual. Because there are any number of reasons why a person might 
choose not to cooperate with authorities in the investigation and prosecution of a sexual 
offense, mutual consent cannot necessarily be inferred from the parties' silence." (emphasis 
added)). 
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arguments, and is unmentioned as such in the Court's Lawrence 
opinion, which renders the fact that consent was not established in the 
record irrelevant by declaring that, well, it was. According to the 
Court: "The petitioners [Lawrence and Gamer] were adults at the 
time of the alleged offense. Their conduct was in private and 
consensual."156 Later: these "two adults . . .  with full and mutual 
consent from each other[] engaged in sexual practices common to a 
homosexual lifestyle."157 
The Court's indulgence of a presumption that the sex Lawrence 
and Gamer had was "full[y] and mutual[ly]" consensual is integral to 
its constitutional project of deregulating sex "as a general rule,"158 
though not logically required by it. Without it, the Court might have 
held, for instance, that Texas's sodomy law violated a right to sexual 
intimacy, because it did not permit Lawrence and Gamer to defend 
themselves against a charge of engaging in . sodomy with proof they 
had done so with "full and mutual consent." Treating the sex at issue 
in Lawrence as though they had, because the State had not proved that 
they had not, thus functions as the fulcrum on which Lawrence sets -
then turns - the scope of its right to sexual intimacy. Making it part of 
its constitutional ruling in the case expands the right to sexual intimacy 
considerably from what it might have been to what it is: from a right 
that might have required the State to allow a consent defense to a 
charge of sodomy to one that precludes State regulation of sodomy 
altogether until the State has proved "injury to a person." The right to 
sexual intimacy, including its presumption that sex is consensual when 
it takes place, is not to be enjoyed at the State's pleasure. It is the 
State's pleasure to regulate sex that the right to sexual intimacy 
protects against. 
To be certain, there is nothing particularly novel here on a 
conceptual level, except perhaps that same-sex sexual conduct is 
afforded the same presumption that it was engaged in with the consent 
of the parties to it that, as a practical and legal matter, if not exactly as 
a matter of constitutional right, heterosexual sexual conduct has long 
enjoyed. The principal novelty of Lawrence is doctrinal: its 
constitutionalization of an individual's right to sexual intimacy that 
entails a rich presumption of consent, which applies equally to cross­
sex and same-sex sex. 
This is not a singularly happy development.159 Male supremacy, 
sexually expressed, chiefly, but not exclusively, in the form of sexual 
156. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
157. Id. at 578. 
158. Id. at 567. 
159. Thanks to Charlotte Croson for conversations that were especially helpful in 
hammering out a number of the points that follow. 
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abuse of women by men, is a constitutive element in the production 
and reproduction of the inequalities between the sexes. In this sense, 
" [s]exuality . . .  is not a discrete sphere of interaction or feeling or 
sensation or behavior in which preexisting social divisions may or may 
not be played out."160 What it is, is: 
a pervasive dimension of social life, one that permeates the whole, a 
dimension along which gender occurs and through which gender is 
socially constituted; it is a dimension along which other social divisions, 
like race and class, partly play themselves out. Dominance eroticized 
defines the imperatives of its masculinity, submission eroticized defines 
its femininity. So many distinctive features of women's status as second 
class - the restriction and constraint and contortion, the servility and the 
display, the self-mutilation and requisite presentation of self as a 
beautiful thing, the enforced passivity, the humiliation - are made into 
the content of sex for women. Being a thing for sexual use is fundamental 
to it. This approach identifies not just a sexuality that is shaped under 
conditions of gender inequality but reveals this sexuality itself to be the 
dynamic of the inequality of the sexes. It is to argue that the excitement 
at reduction of a person to a thing, to less than a human being, as socially 
defined, is its fundamental motive force. It is to argue that sexual 
difference is a function of sexual dominance. It is to argue a sexual theory 
of the distribution of social power by gender, in which this sexuality that 
is sexuality is substantially what makes the gender division be what it is, 
which is male dominant, wherever it is, which is nearly everywhere.161 
Sandra Bartky has summarized the modest theoretical point necessary 
for present purposes where she observes that: "the eroticization of 
relations of domination . . .  surely perpetuates" "the system of male 
supremacy. "162 
If this is so, Lawrence's individuation of sexuality, hence its 
individuation of sexual abuse, takes a substantive position on existing 
inequalities between the sexes. They are the product of autonomously 
made sexual decisions that are constitutionally protected as such. The 
ideological determinants of all these decisions, 163 as well as their social 
160. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 130 
(1989). 
161. Id. 
162. SANDRA LEE BARTKY, FEMININITY AND DOMINATION: STUDIES IN THE 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF OPPRESSION 51 (1992). 
163. The Court could have forestalled some of the sex-equality concerns with its 
Lawrence decision had it confronted, and disavowed, male supremacy, which has not only 
conditioned heterosexuality and its sexual violence, but also prohibitions against 
homosexuality. Within male supremacy, homosexuality is seen as an act of sexual violence 
per se; in the words of William Blackstone, quoted with approval in Chief Justice Burger's 
concurring opinion in Hardwick, sodomy - long the master metonym for homosexuality -
is "an offense of even 'deeper malignity' than rape." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 168, 197 
(Burger, J., concurring) (citations omitted). This position serves to stigmatize homosexuality 
and, simultaneously, to obscure the realities of same-sex sexual violence, treating the 
phenomenon both as a justification for homophobic abuse when its victims are (or are 
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and political effects, are never analyzed. In silence, have they been 
affirmed? 
I hope not. Still, the Court's choice not to tell us leaves 
perpetrators of sexual abuse free to argue that Lawrence reauthorizes, 
in formally new doctrinal terms, old-fashioned constraints on sex 
equality measures designed to redress sex inequality through 
limitations on sexual abuse. To appreciate the potential stakes, 
consider the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson, the fountainhead of the Supreme Court's sexual harassment 
jurisprudence - perhaps the classic example of a doctrinal regime in 
which limitations on sexual violence in the form of prohibitions against 
sexual harassment are grounded in sex-equality concerns. In Meritor, 
the Supreme Court announced that sexual harassment rules were not 
to be governed by the criminal law's ordinary sexual injury standards. 
According to Meritor, the touchstone of a "hostile work environment" 
sexual harassment claim under Title VII is whether a plaintiff can 
establish, inter alia, "that the alleged sexual advances were 
unwelcome, not whether . . .  actual participation in sexual intercourse 
was voluntary."164 Thus, the Court went on to hold, "the fact that sex­
related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the complainant was 
not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual 
harassment suit brought under Title VIl. "165 In saying so, Meritor 
opened, but left unsettled, whether the State could, as a general 
matter, replace "'voluntariness' in the sense of consent"166 with a 
thought to be) heterosexual, and with derision when victims are (or are thought to be) gay. 
Addressing the male-supremacist dimensions of sodomy prohibitions, and declaring them 
unconstitutional because of them, would have thus set the Court well on its way to delivering 
lesbian and gay victims of sexual abuse a right to sexual freedom they could have enjoyed. 
Given the Court's own like-straight reasoning, this result would have been good for survivors 
of sexual abuse across the board. But the Court chose not to follow this course, even though 
it had the perfect opportunity to do so, presented both by the Texas law before the Court, 
sex discriminatory on its face, see MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken, supra note 91, as well 
as by the amicus brief submitted by the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, which 
made a sex-equality argument against sodomy bans, see Brief of Now Legal Defense and 
Education Fund as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4-25, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) (No. 02-102). Rather than taking advantage of these opportunities to clarify that 
neither its like-straight reasoning nor its corresponding right to sexual intimacy is aligned 
with male supremacy, the Court lets them pass without mention, hence leaves open - even 
invites - sex-equality theory's question about what its decision means for lesbian and gay 
(and other) victims of sexual abuse. The opinion of Judge Marsha Berzon in Anderson v. 
Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), is in certain respects a predictable consequence of the Court's decision in Lawrence. 
164. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). Cf Brief of Respondent 
Mechelle Vinson at 23, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979) 
[hereinafter Vinson Brief) ("It is false that the Court of Appeals 'eliminates unwelcomeness 
as an issue.' Perhaps the Bank perceives this because it does not distinguish, as do the Court 
of Appeals and respondent, between sexual advances that are welcome and sexual 
intercourse that appears voluntary." (citation omitted)). 
165. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. 
166. Id. at 69. 
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welcomeness167 standard as the crease between legally actionable 
sexual violence and sex, including as a matter of criminal law.168 
This is the point at which the sex-equality concerns with Lawrence 
can be articulated in doctrinal terms: Citing Lawrence, with its 
individuation of sexual violence and sex, and its reliance on "consent" 
as the dividing line between them, perpetrators of sexual harassment 
might insist that, in order to respect Lawrence's constitutional right to 
sexual intimacy, sexual harassment rules, which are (at least as the 
Supreme Court has affirmed them, to date) statutorily grounded,169 
must be rewritten to allow for a "voluntariness" or "consent" defense 
167. Id. 
168. For a "rereading protocol" that calls for "not believing Mechelle Vinson on the 
crucial questions of unwantedness and consent," hence for disputing her credibility on both 
grounds, in order to challenge sexual-harassment law and its sex-equality underpinnings as 
part of a queer-theoretic effort to oppose the legal regulation of sex, see Janet Halley, 
Roundtable Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments, 12 TEX. J. OF WOMEN & L. 224, 226-29 
(2003); cf Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LAW 182 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) [hereinafter Halley, 
Sexuality Harassment] (offering a similar type of rereading of the facts of Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)). But see generally Marc Spindelman, 
Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra, at 201 
(providing a critical assessment of this interpretive protocol, its aims, including its sexual 
politics, its ethics, and its dangers); Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, supra note 101. 
169. A number of lower courts have held that they are constitutionally, and not just 
statutorily, guaranteed. See, e.g. , Moring v. Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 243 F.3d 452, 455 (8th 
Cir. 2001); Riley v. Buckner, 1 Fed. Appx. 130, 133 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Beardsley v. Webb, 
30 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1994)); Noland v. McAdoo, 39 F.3d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1994); Annis 
v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1994); Gierlinger v. New York State 
Police, 15 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1994); Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1991); 
King v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Bohen 
v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1 185 (7th Cir. 1986)); Andrews v. City of 
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478-79 (3d Cir. 1990); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 
890 F.2d 569, 575-76 (2d Cir. 1989); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814-15 (10th Cir. 1989); 
Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 429 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989); Volk v. 
Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1433 (7th Cir. 1988); Long v. Laramie County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 840 
F.2d 743, 752-53 (10th Cir. 1988); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1 185 (7th 
Cir. 1986); Huebschen v. Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1 171-72 (7th Cir. 
1983); Quinn v. Nassau County Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); 
Collins v. Christopher, 48 F. Supp. 2d 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Carney v. City of Shawnee, 
38 F.Supp. 2d 905, 911 (D. Kan. 1999); Beattie v. Farnsworth Middle Sch., 143 F.Supp.2d 220, 
231-32 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Vandermeerv v. Douglas County, 15 F. Supp. 2d 970, 984 (D.Nev. 
1998); Huffman v. City of Prairie Vill. 980 F. Supp. 1192, 1205 (D. Kan. 1997); Chapin v. 
Univ. of Mass. at Lowell, 977 F. Supp. 72, 80 (D. Mass 1997); Murray v. Kutzke, 967 F. Supp. 
337, 345 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Wise v. New York City Police Dep't, 928 F. Supp. 355, 364 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1531-32 
(D. Ala. 1994); Stafford v. State of Missouri, 835 F. Supp. 1136, 1140 (W.D. Mo. 1993); 
Fuchilla v. Prockop, 682 F. Supp. 247, 255 (D.N.J. 1987); Estate of Scott v. deLeon, 603 F. 
Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Gobla v. Crestwood Sch. Dist., 609 F. Supp. 972, 978-79 
(M.D. Pa. 1985); Skadegaard v. Farrell, 578 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-17 (D.N.J. 1984); Woerner v. 
Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517, 519-20 (N.D. Ill. 1981); County of Los Angeles v. Sup. Ct., 981 
P.2d 68, 71 (Cal. 1999). The Supreme Court's own opinion in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
(1979), as well as its ruling in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 
(1998), to mention two relevant precedents, lend support to the notion that they are 
constitutionally required. But so far, no Supreme Court decision has squarely held they are. 
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to a sexual harassment charge. If the State is constitutionally required 
to presume that sex is consensual if it took place, and if sex that has 
not ultimately been proved not to have been consensual is, as such, 
beyond the State's regulatory authority, harassers might assert there is 
no principled, constitutional justification for holding that the 
voluntariness of sexual activity backgrounding a sexual harassment 
claim (when it does) "ha[s] no [legal] materiality whatsoever."170 It is, 
they might say, the whole ballgame. 
Continuing, perpetrators of sexual harassment might contend that 
if non-consent is a constitutional precondition for state intervention 
into the sexual arena, even assuming all other elements of a sexual 
harassment cause of action can be met and are constitutionally 
adequate, proof that sexuality was "unwelcome" is not a sufficient 
warrant for state action.171 Only "non-consent" will do. From this, it is 
a relatively small step to the proposal - not wholly unlike those 
recently floated by some queer theorists and other sexual libertarians 
- that sexual harassment, because sexual, is individual, hence 
personal, hence protected.172 Lawrence does generally see sexuality, if 
170. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62. 
171. Brenda Cossman, for example, while speaking about Twyman v. Twyman, 855 
S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993), sketches an argument along these lines in the name of "sex radical 
feminism": 
Sex radical feminism, in keeping with its insistence on sex and sexuality as ambivalent, 
producing the possibilities of pleasure and danger, would focus attention on the question of 
consent. While the absence of consent could justify legal intervention, if the sexual 
encounters appeared to be consensual, if Sheila Twyman agreed to participate in the 
bondage, then the fact that she did not enjoy the sex encounter would not be sufficient to 
make it actionable. Sex radical feminism would emphasize that although consensual SIM 
may not be to everyone's erotic taste, it should be recognized as a legitimate sexual choice. 
Brenda Cossman, Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 617, 622 (2003) (italics added). Cossman does not cite, and I am otherwise 
unaware of, any sex equality argument in the legal academic literature that calls for 
unpleasant or unpleasurable or even unenjoyed sex to be legally actionable as sexual abuse. 
172. Cf Vinson Brief, supra note 164, at 15-16. A number of academic commentators, 
writing in the name of feminism, have recently begun to emphasize the "regulatory" nature 
of anti-sexual-violence regimes. See, e.g. , Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 1 12 YALE 
L.J. 2061 (2003). Some so-called "sex radicals" and "queer theorists" - sometimes donning 
a feminist mantle, sometimes not - are unambiguously hostile to the "regulatory" nature of 
anti-sexual-violence rules, seeing them as a form of (sexual) oppression because sexuality is 
their object. See, e.g. , Jane Gallop, Resisting Reasonableness, 25 CRITTCAL INQUIRY 599, 608 
(1999); Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 168; Ann Pellegrini, Pedagogy 's Turn: 
Observations on Students, Teachers, and Transference-Love, 25 CRITICAL INQUIRY 617 
(1999). In these and other analyses, see, e.g., Mary Coombs, Title VII and Homosexual 
Harassment After Oncale: Was It a Victory?, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 113 (1999), it is 
sometimes suggested that lesbians and gay men as "sexual minorities" will be (have been) 
(are being) victimized by feminist law reform projects, claimed to be susceptible of 
homophobic manipulation. See, e.g. , Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 168, at 190-
193, 195-96. Jn at least one case, feminist reform projects are maligned as homophobic 
themselves. Id. at 190-93; cf Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy, supra note 95, at 1723 n.5 
(noting the "occasional(]," but "disturbing male-homophobic drift," of "feminist analysis of 
legal sanctions against homosexuality"); id. at 1725 ("[A]ny assumption that 
hetero/homosexual dynamics must originate in, or ultimately produce, gender hierarchy or 
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not sexual harassment per se, this way, and protects it through the Due 
Process Clause for that very reason. With Lawrence, if the inequalities 
between the sexes are the product of choices that individuals make, 
which are constitutionally protected as such, why is the choice to have 
sex with co-workers, supervisors, supervisees,173 classmates, teachers, 
students,174 even fellow prisoners,175 in an institutional setting, not 
gender identity gives analytic priority to heterosexuality, with its definitional dependence on 
the concept of male and female, of masculine and feminine, as matching opposites."); accord 
EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 31 (1990). The scope of the 
dangers for lesbians and gay men are typically unsubstantiated as an empirical matter. See, 
e.g., Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, supra note 101, at 12-13 n.25, 13-14 (noting this); 
Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the 
Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 680 (1998) (same). Also absent 
from these attacks on sexual harassment law and theory is why the possibility of homophobic 
abuse should defeat feminist law reform efforts, which are themselves opposed to 
homophobia, and their successes. I engage these problems in greater detail in Spindelman, 
Sex Equality Panic, supra. 
173. For one recent effort that would seem sympathetic to this conclusion, see Schultz, 
supra note 172, at 2184-91 (arguing for workplace intimacy on various grounds). Schultz 
maintains: 
[A] number of scholars and popular writers recommend that companies create open climates 
and take a permissive approach to romantic relationships, intervening only where it is clear 
that genuine conflicts of interest exist or where it is clear that productivity is being 
undermined . . . .  [B]y recognizing the inevitability of sexuality in organizational life and 
addressing it with openness and tolerance, as sociologists Christine Williams and Dana 
Britton put it, "we can begin to formulate less oppressive forms of organizational life, ways 
of living in organizations that allow for diversity in sexual norms and expressions and that 
encourage mutual respect . . . .  [This] is a crucial first step in making the workplace a more 
equitable environment for everyone." 
Id. at 2188 (final omission and alteration in the original) (quoting Christine L. Williams & 
Dana M. Britton, Sexuality and Work, in INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS 1, 13 (Craig 
Calhoun & George Ritzer eds., 1995)) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 
2189-90 ("In a world in which sexual harassment law no longer creates pressures to 
desexualize, most organizations should have less incentive to address potential favoritism 
charges by banning and punishing intimacy."). Then again, no less sympathetic with it are 
some now-discredited sexual harassment decisions. See, e.g. , Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & 
Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (no sex­
equality remedy for "what amounts to a physical attack motivated by sexual desire"); Corne 
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated without opinion, 562 
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (no liability for sex discrimination where the sexual conduct of a 
supervisor was based on a "personal urge"). 
174. See, e.g. , Gallop, supra note 172; Pellegrini, supra note 172. 
175. For an analysis of male-on-male sexual violence in prisons, not oblivious to sex­
equality theory, but built largely on the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment "deliberate­
indifference" jurisprudence, chiefly Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), rather than its 
Fourteenth Amendment sex-equality doctrine, see Christopher D. Man & John P. Cronan, 
Forecasting Sexual Abuse in Prison: The Prison Subculture of Masculinity as a Backdrop for 
"Deliberate Indifference," 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 127 (2001). Included in the data 
Man and Cronan cite is evidence that "[h]omosexual or bisexual inmates often report that 
prison officials refuse to investigate their claims seriously because the officials presume that 
any sex that these inmates engage in is consensual." Id. at 145 & n.94 (citing PETER L. NACCI 
& THOMAS R. KANE, SEX AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION IN FEDERAL PRISONS 16 (1982)). See 
supra note 98 (referring to the views of Association of Association of State Correctional 
Administrators' President Reginald Wilkinson on same-sex prison rape). They do also 
comment that "courts have noted that at some prisons 'there appears to be a strong 
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protected as well? Doesn't Lawrence announce in its opening breath 
that liberty, which protects freedom, extends "outside the home" and 
has both "spatial and more transcendent dimensions"?176 
More modestly, perpetrators of sexual violence and others could 
advance their cause by arguing that Lawrence etches the distinction 
between "unwelcome" and "involuntary" sex, articulated and followed 
in Meritor, into the Constitution. Building on this suggestion, they 
could say that Lawrence, while perhaps not a justification for the total 
erasure of existing sex-equality protections against sexual violence, 
does stand as an affirmative road-block to efforts designed to extend 
them beyond their current (institutional) settings. Countenancing their 
expansion past their present limits into the remainder of the social 
world, they could continue, would be tantamount to reauthorizing 
State-sponsored coercion of individual choice in sex, inviting the State 
to become "omnipresent" in the sexual sphere, once again, and "to 
define the meaning of [intimate] relationship[ s] [and] to set [their] 
boundaries"177 without adequate constitutional justification.178 It is a 
familiar, if tired, trope to caricature sex-equality theory as creeping 
toward totalitarianism,179 as if it were sex equality, rather than its 
opposite, that moved in those directions. Through its express 
mobilization of anti-totalitarian rhetoric and its failure to recognize 
presumption on the part of prison officials that, in the absence of outward physical harm to 
assaulted inmates, such as cuts, abrasions, and bruises, no sexual assault occurred."' Id. & 
n.95 (quoting Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 918 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd and remanded 
sub nom, Ruiz v. United States, 243 F.3d 9421 (5th Cir. 2001)). That these norms may 
amount to deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as the authors 
argue, does not also make them not gendered, hence (in addition) a violation of sex-equality 
rights. 
176. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. Lawrence itself may offer an answer through its cryptic 
reference to "abuse of an institution the law protects," id. at 567, as an independent reason 
justifying governmental regulation of sex, in addition to prohibiting sexual injury to a person. 
It could be mobilized to block these lines of argument, thus keeping the principle of 
Lawrence from being driven as a stake into the body of the Court's sex-equality - or at least 
its sexual-harassment - doctrine. Sex equality, after all, is supposed to be an institution that 
the law protects. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
177. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
178. What will happen to rape-shield laws, and other feminist law reform successes in 
the sexual violence arena, is unclear. Cf Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal 
Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 799-800 (1988) (describing some of the 
successes that Lawrence may draw into question).  
179. The smear is advanced, among others, by WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: 
POWER ANO FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 93 (1995). For recent, not unqualified, 
criticism of Brown's work for recasting feminist struggles against sexual violence in a 
Nietzschean framework of ressentiment, "endowed with a 'slave morality' that makes it react 
to pain emotionally by inflicting suffering in return," and, correspondingly, for its anti­
feminist theoretical and political alignments, see Carine M. Mardorossian, Toward a New 
Feminist Theory of Rape, 27 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y 743, 758-66 (2002) 
(quote on 760). 
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that "domination by private individuals"180 can totally occupy a life, 
Lawrence succors these lies. 
Without losing all of them, the concerns with Lawrence's 
possibilities can be transposed into its own conceptual register. Even if 
one takes the position Lawrence does - that sexual violence can be 
handled on an individualized basis, rather than as a class-based 
problem with individual dimensions - one still has to engage the fact 
that observable patterns emerge from the "individual choices" that 
individuals make in sex; dominance and aggression, hence inequality 
and force, operate in sex as sex, through desire, making sex what it 
(typically) is, socially speaking. They define the context in which 
consent to sex is often given, hence give meaning to "consent" itself 
under existing sex-unequal social conditions. Beyond noting that anal 
sex is a sexual practice that is common to a "homosexual lifestyle," by 
which the Court presumably means that it is a common practice 
among gay men, hence a reason to protect it, the Court does not 
discuss sexuality's normalized and normalizing, as opposed to its inter­
personal, features - not, at least, as a reason to question its own 
assumptions about the meaningfulness of consent. Lawrence has 
nothing to say, for instance, about inequality and force in sex, treating 
them as completely beneath notice. 
Not mentioning them, of course, does not make them disappear. 
Where, though, have they gone? Could it be, as was the case in Powell 
and Onofre, that they have been absorbed into the Court's version of 
"consent," been built into it, so to speak? If they have, the Court may 
have effectively doomed the State to under-regulate sexual abuse by 
converting a good amount of it, definitionally, into consensual sex, 
hence placing it beyond the State's reach. The Court may believe it has 
given the State all the room it could want or need to provide optimal 
levels of sexual-violence prohibitions, by formally recognizing that the 
State retains the authority under its "general rule" to regulate sexual 
harm as a crime against a person.181 Without acknowledging the 
180. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. 
REV. 387, 407 (1984). 
181. Some commentators, anyway, do. As Chai Feldblum, for example, wrote shortly 
after the Court handed down its Lawrence decision: 
It is easy for me to say that a state can regulate "deviant activities" that also harm other 
people. So, for example, I think a state can regulate all forms of private incest and sexual 
abuse because doing so protects people who would be harmed by those acts. 
And nothing in the Lawrence opinion diminishes the right of government to regulate sexual 
activities that harm other people. (Anyone who says otherwise is engaging in absurd scare 
tactics and does not understand the compelling government interest in preventing harm!) 
Chai Feldblum, Interview, at http://www.e-thepeople.org/static/cfeldbloom_interview.html 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2004). Various reasons I offer in these pages suggest why I disagree. In 
addition, it should be noted that it may simply not be enough to offer that limitations on 
sexual abuse are (or should be held to be) a legitimate infringement on the "fundamental 
right to sexual intimacy." But see David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? 
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pervasiveness of inequality and force in sex and their role in 
constituting it as such, and more importantly, their actual capacity to 
vitiate, which is to say, to compel consent, hence to produce harm, it 
may not. It should have. 
Thinking, apparently, that it is simple to protect sexuality from 
"unwarranted governmental intrusion"182 while simultaneously 
offering the State the requisite authority to address the injuries that 
sex can produce by making "consent" its touchstone, 183 the Court 
avoids noticing or grappling with the questions its opinion in Lawrence 
throws down. To voice a few: Will the State be allowed, after 
Lawrence, to void the constitutional presumption that sex is 
consensual if it happens, for example, by proving in individual cases 
that consent was given because of inequality and force? If so, how 
much inequality and force, and what kinds, will be enough? Will the 
standard vary depending on how "intimate" the relationship is?184 Will 
there be one rule for long-term sexual partners and another for flings 
and one-night stands?185 Another altogether for anonymous sex? How 
Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 
315 n.92 (2000) (arguing that, under a '"sexual autonomy"' approach, "criminal rape laws, 
which forbid some sexual encounters . . . .  need not be subject to strict scrutiny - even 
though they would certainly be sustained." (quoting STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED 
SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998))); accord Cass R. 
Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 
2003 SUP. Cr. REV. 27, 61 (2004) [hereinafter Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?] ("If 
consensual sex is not involved, there is no fundamental right that would require the state to 
provide a compelling justification."). Doctrinally-speaking, even if harm regulation, if not 
also sex-equality, is, indeed, a sufficiently strong, even compelling, governmental justification 
for enacting and enforcing laws against sexual abuse, those restrictions would still be subject 
to a "tailoring" or "narrow tailoring" analytic. What will happen to them there? On the 
margins, will the needs and interests of victims of sexual violence be sacrificed in the name of 
protecting sexual freedom? Formally, Lawrence leaves these questions open. But in just this 
way, through its declaration of a right to sexual intimacy, Lawrence cabins - at the very 
least, it reframes - the field of sexual regulation, including regulation designed to put an 
end to sexual abuse. 
182. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). 
183. See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 181, at 61 (referring to consent 
as "the predicate for Lawrence"). 
184. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice."). 
185. As Kenneth Karst explains: 
[A]ny effective legal shelter for this value [of intimate association] must offer some 
protection to casual associations as well as lasting ones. . . . One reason for extending 
constitutional protection to casual intimate associations is that they may ripen into durable 
intimate associations. Indeed, the value of commitment is fully realizable only in an 
atmosphere of freedom to choose whether a particular association will be fleeting or 
enduring. A doctrinal system extending the freedom of intimate association only to cases of 
enduring commitment would require intolerable inquiries into subjects that should be kept 
private, including state of mind. 
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do the "spatial dimensions" of sexual intimacy fit in here? Will 
inequalities and force that are recognized as such in a public space -
on the street, say, or in a public restroom, or in a car parked on a 
lover's lane - be erased when sex takes place in a "private" space, 
such as a private club, fraternity house, boarding school, or a marital 
bedroom ?186 
How much sexual abuse the Court may be willing to tolerate, 
because it sees it as just sex, hence how much it may be willing to limit 
the State's authority to regulate sexual intimacies, misapprehending 
what those are, is suggested by what Lawrence goes out of its way to 
tell us expressly about sexual violence among gay men. As it draws to 
a close, the Court indicates that it has heard and, it seems, been moved 
by Paul Smith's suggestion that "homosexual rape" is "not a problem 
that needs to be addressed," or that its "victims are more able to 
protect themselves."187 In its own words, the Court writes: This case 
Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, supra note 24, at 633. In a footnote, he adds, "There 
is irony here, because casual sexual intimacy usually is the exact antithesis of the intimacy 
that involves caring. Yet if the freedom of intimate association is to extend to lasting 
nonmarital relationships, the practical argument for protecting casual association becomes 
conclusive." Id. at 633 n.45; see also id. at 688 (reiterating the point that "any constitutional 
protection of enduring sexual relationships can be effective only if it is extended to the 
choice to engage in casual ones"). Karst qualifies the divorce of casual sex from intimacy 
with the claim that "even a casual sexual relationship involves intimacy in the sense of 
selective disclosures of intimate information." Id. at 634 n.48. For other views on the 
connection between casual sex and sexual intimacy, see, for example, MICHAEL WARNER, 
THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLmcs, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 115 (1999) 
("The most fleeting sexual encounter is, in its way, intimate."); id. at 176-77 ("I think 
[Richard Mohr] is right to point to a kind of privacy - even intimacy - in the gay male 
practice of public sex . . . .  " (emphasis added)); Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in 
AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197, 215 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988) 
(proposing that the "inestimable value of sex [is) - at least in certain of its ineradicable 
aspects - [that it is] anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving"); see also LEO 
BERSANI, HOMOS 7 (1995) (exploring "in gay desire . . . .  a redefinition of sociality so radical 
that it may appear to require a provisional withdrawal from relationality itself'). 
186. Michael Warner, in an interview with Annamarie Jagose, discussing "public sex," 
has observed that "in the usual sense of the term . . .  [it] also retains an important kind of 
privacy. People who seek out sex in the parks or in toilets or in bathhouses do not usually do 
so indiscriminately and for the whole world's involvement. There is a presumption of consent, 
and a reasonable presumption of the exclusion of anyone who does not consent." Annamarie 
Jagose, Queer World Making: Annamarie Jagose Interviews Michael Warner, 31 GENDERS 2,  
'II 30 (2000) (emphasis added), at http://www.genders.org/g31/g31jagose.htrnl. Others, 
including Richard Mohr, agree. Taking the point farther than many have (and, I think, most 
would), Mohr writes: "[M]any may find orgy rooms at bathhouses and backrooms in bars not 
to be private. This view is wrong, for if the participants are all consenting to be there with 
each other for the possibility of sex polymorphic, then they fulfill the proper criterion of the 
private in the realm of the sexual." MOHR, supra note 109, at 105 (footnote omitted). He 
continues: "If, as  i s  the case, gay cruising zones of  parks at  night have as  their habitues only 
gay cruisers, police cruisers, and queerbashers, then they too are private in the requisite 
sense . . . .  " Id. 
187. See supra notes 130-149 and accompanying text. 
1660 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:1615 
"does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are 
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. "188 
It would have been understandable had the Court modestly 
ventured that Lawrence did not involve persons who were claiming, or 
had claimed, they had been sexually violated. Again, the Court does 
tell us twice that the sex Lawrence and Garner had was consensual. In 
offering that Lawrence does not "involve persons who might be 
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent 
might not easily be refused," the Court is thus saying something else 
again: The sex they had could not have been violative. Roughly 
consistent with its belief that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression 
in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more enduring,"189 the Court's 
opinion seems to imagine that the sexual conduct the men engaged in 
could not produce injury because it was relationship-based, hence 
intimate. Why it does - as in, how it could - is unclear. The most the 
Court knew, based on the record before it, was that Lawrence and 
Garner had anal sex.190 It happened. That is all. It may or may not have 
been intimate. With respect to the Court, sex need imply nothing 
more, and when it does, it need not be the felicitous "personal bond 
that is more enduring" the Court imagines. Sexual abuse can produce 
personal bonds that are "more enduring," too. 
In any event, the Court's description of what Lawrence does not 
involve, of what it is not about, is in conceptual conflict with its 
understanding of what it does, and is. But the tension never registers 
within Lawrence, and is, therefore, never resolved. The Court shows 
no indication it is aware, for instance, that its finding that the sex 
188. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
189. Id. at 567. 
190. Id. at 563. And, of course, that it took place in Lawrence's apartment. Id. The 
Court's opinion does not actually describe the sex Lawrence and Garner had, as such, as 
either "relationship-based" or "intimate," though it repeatedly implies, as in the passage I 
am dealing with in the text, that it was one or the other - or both. Cf, e.g. , Franke, supra 
note 4, at 1408 (observing that facts about the kind of relationship Lawrence and Garner 
had, including whether it was, in fact, a relationship, were absent from the record, that "none 
of the briefing in the case indicated that they were in a relationship," and then going on to 
comment that the Court "[n]evertheless . . .  took it as given that Lawrence and Garner were 
in [one]"). At certain points in the opinion, sexual intimacy seems to follow from the actual 
or assumed existence of a relationship, see supra text accompanying notes 189-190, whereas 
at others, the inference runs in the other direction, see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("When 
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be 
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring."). Lawrence persistently refuses 
to settle the lexical priority of the terms (if there is any). It also avoids any final decision on 
what matrix of factual considerations are necessary or sufficient to give rise to either of 
them, even as it suggests that "the most private human conduct, sexual behavior," id. , that 
occurs "in the most private of places, the home," id. , is enough to underwrite the 
announcement that sodomy Jaws, which step on both, "seek to control a . . .  relationship that, 
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to 
choose without being punished as criminals." Id. 
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Lawrence and Garner had was consensual loses much - if not all -
of its normative force should it be true, as the Court maintains, that 
they cannot be sexually abused. If gay men like Lawrence and Garner, 
and perhaps lesbian women as well, are not persons who might be 
violated through same-sex sex, what does it mean for them to say 
"yes" to sex when they do? When sex takes place, does it matter that 
they might have actually said - and meant - "no"? That they may 
have limited (or conditioned) their consent?191 That they might not 
have thought about the relationship as "intimate"?192 As equal? Does 
it matter that age, race, and socio-economic differences between them 
may have structured the erotics of this sexual exchange? Why - or 
more exactly, why not? 
Perhaps one reason the Court does not pursue this line of inquiry is 
that its opinion seems to approve of sexual initiation. Remarkably, it 
does not disavow it when it takes form as sexual aggression. The Court 
appears willing, for example, to treat sex as consensual if it is not 
"refused."193 Sexual initiation, according to this familiar logic, which 
may reflect one person's desire for sex, makes the sex that follows, 
without more, mutually consented-to. Too bad that it does not. 
Acquiescence, even silence, in the face of sex "does not mean nothing 
happened, and it does not mean consent."194 Especially not when 
victims' claims of sexual violation are, as they are, so commonly 
disbelieved. Should refusal of consent be a measure of sexual violence, 
why not escalate a "request" for sex until a partner finally submits or 
stops refusing? When it is said that in this very escalationist dynamic 
lies a joy of sex195 - a joy that sexual regulation could (or would) deny 
191. See Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent: "No" Means "No, " But What 
Does "Yes" Mean?, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2341, 2360 (2004) [hereinafter Note, Acquaintance 
Rape and Degrees of Consent] (proposing one benefit of acknowledging the phenomenon of 
post-penetration rape is that it "creates a mechanism through which sexual intercourse can 
be conditioned on terms established prior to the actual act," and suggesting that, conversely, 
"[i]f postpenetration rape is not recognized, then whatever terms the two parties set as a 
condition to intercourse can be ignored by the man once intercourse has begun, even if the 
woman revokes her consent"). 
192. See supra note 190. 
193. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
194. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 170 (1987). In this way, T.S. 
Eliot's "welcome of indifference," T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land (1922), reprinted in 2 THE 
NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, 1475, 1484 (M.H. Abrams ed., 1962), cited 
in Donald Dripps, Panel Discussion, Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 145-
46 & n.66 (1994), turns out to be neither, but a myth, although not one the law invariably 
sees as such. See Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 
YALE L.J. 2687, 2689 (1991) (suggesting that courts have interpreted "consent" in rape cases 
to include "absence of consent or silence"). 
195. As Donald Dripps declaims: 
[T]ypical sexual encounters begin at a low level of physical intimacy and escalate. Women 
are expected to object when male advances exceeµ female preference. Unless a man either 
exploits an unconscious or incompetent victim, or induces a woman's acquiescence by 
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- whom will we believe: the person who claims that this was "just 
sex," or the one who maintains that he was sexually abused? Entirely 
unconsidered by the Court is the possibility that consent that is not 
initially refused is, at some point along the way, withdrawn. What is to 
happen then?1% Constitutionally speaking, what can the State do?197 
After Lawrence, the answer is, at best, unclear. 
To infer that sex was consensual from the mere fact that it 
occurred, as the Court's Lawrence opinion does, tips the constitutional 
scales in favor of sex, which is to say, in favor of perpetrators of sexual 
violence or some other wrongful pressure, this doesn't seem like so much to ask. The critical 
thing is to avoid discontinuous, catastrophic moves from one stage of intimacy to the next . 
. . . [T]he transition from penetration of the mouth by the tongue to the penetration of an 
orifice by the penis is neither instantaneous nor unscripted. The partners will have time to 
object to sex acts they don't like, typically before those acts occur, and in any event 
immediately upon their initiation. 
Dripps, supra note 194, at 146. But see infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
196. There are not many reported cases involving withdrawn consent - or more exactly, 
consent that is withdrawn after penetration. Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of 
Consent, supra note 191, at 2356. "Courts in three states - Maryland, North Carolina, and 
California - have explicitly rejected the idea that a woman can withdraw consent after 
penetration." Id. (The decisions are: Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266 (Md. 1980), State v. Way, 
254 S.E.2d 760 (N.C. 1979), and People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1985), 
respectively.) "Seven state courts - in Alaska, California (overturning the decision in Vela), 
Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, and South Dakota - have explicitly held that a 
woman can withdraw consent after penetration." Id. at 2358. Those decisions (in the same 
order) are: McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001), People v. John Z. (In re John 
Z.), 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003), State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994), State v. 
Bunyard, 75 P.3d 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1985), 
State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), and State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662 
(S.D. 1994)). Just last year, Illinois passed a law that makes postpenetration rape criminally 
actionable. Public Act 93-389, ch. 38, sec. 12-17, § 5(c), 2003 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2217, 2217 
(West) ("A person who initially consents to sexual penetration or sexual conduct is not 
deemed to have consented to any sexual penetration or sexual conduct that occurs after he 
or she withdraws consent during the course of that sexual penetration or sexual conduct."). 
Resistance to efforts to define post-penetration consent revocation as rape testifies volumes 
to the continuing vitality of the associations between penetration and possession, see, e.g. , 
Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent, supra, at 2361 ("Where's Daddy? Who 
didn't teach this girl the rules of engagement? . . .  You don't take a boy to bed and then say 
'no.' . . .  John Z. wasn't guilty of rape; he was guilty of being male." (quoting Kathleen 
Parker, Editorial, In California, Rape Becomes Her Choice, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 11 ,  
2003, at A12)), not to mention what "loss of self-control" during sex can mean when 
inscribed as protected in law. Cf Dripps, supra note 194, at 147 ("Call it 'eroticized 
domination,' call it the 'robust, uncomplicated lay' - call it whatever you like, but don't 
deny that, from whatever causes, the loss of control is a central feature of sexual 
experience."). As to what ought to be the analytically prior matter, Richie McMullen 
describes how "consent can shift to non-consent during love-making" in same-sex 
relationships, no less than in cross-sex ones, in RICHIE J. MCMULLEN, MALE RAPE: 
BREAKING THE SILENCE ON THE LAST TABOO 50 (1990). 
197. Does the constitutional right to sexual intimacy Lawrence announces, for instance, 
entail a "reasonable time" for a perpetrator to "quell his primal urge" when consent to sex, 
initially given, has been revoked? See Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent, 
supra note 191, at 2362-63 & n.1 15 (discussing cases). 
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violence, by dictating that consent must be affirmatively refused - a 
far cry from affirmatively sought and given.198 Desire and sex patterned 
on a hierarchical model of sexuality are privileged in this scheme.199 
What does this mean for sexual abuse? Does it enhance, rather than 
diminish, an unwilling sexual partner's ability to make his (sexual) will 
known and followed? The Court offers no reply beyond its opinion's 
empty reassurance that the case "does not involve persons who might 
be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where 
consent might not easily be refused."200 Again, why not? What has 
Lawrence freed? 
To be clear, the point here is not that gay sex is always harmful, 
whether in a meaningfully intimate relationship or not. Nor is it that 
there can never be consent to sex. Rather, the point is that there are 
hazards that attend the Court's announced right to sexual intimacy, 
particularly its deep presumption of consent to sex, for victims of 
sexual violence, most of all. It is also to ask what will count as sexual 
injury in a regime like Lawrence's that renders serious State inquiry 
into the circumstances of sex and consent beyond the pale as a legal 
norm. Whatever the definition, how will we know if someone has been 
sexually injured if investigation, surveillance, and prosecution by the 
State are themselves thought to be repressively sex-intrusive?201 For 
the Court, it should be kept in mind, it is State-sponsored sexual 
regulation that is the quintessence of constitutionally cognizable sexual 
coercion, the Due Process violation.202 By contrast, Lawrence does not 
recognize a constitutional sex-equality right to meaningful State 
protection from sexual violence. There still is no constitutional right 
not to be raped.203 Federal legislative efforts that might have signaled a 
198. An important feature of Lawrence's novelty, that is to say, is its 
constitutionalization of existing cultural and legal norms that have long favored sex, hence 
privileged and protected perpetrators of sexual abuse at victims' expense. Cf Anderson v. 
Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
199. Measuring violation by the refusal of consent, hence treating acquiescence to sexual 
initiation as tantamount to consent to it, puts the burden on those who do not want sex to 
make their lack of desire for it known and respected. Survivors of sexual abuse may react to 
sexual initiation through silence without meaning to signal "yes." They may also experience 
unwanted sexual initiations as an encore of their abuse, hence violation. What does that 
matter? Within Lawrence, not much. It may even not matter at all. The ongoing nature of 
intimate relationships in which lesbians and gay men find themselves gives rise to a 
presumption of consent to sex, which is always already there before it is affirmatively taken 
away. In law, it may be. That alone does not make it so as a matter of life. 
200. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added). 
201. See supra note 172. 
202. Robin L. West, Lecture, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119 (2003). 
203. Prisoners may, in name, enjoy such a right. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
843-44 (1994). According to the Farmer Court: 
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change in the social and legal, hence institutional landscape, thus 
providing constitutional grounding for a right to protections against 
sexual abuse,204 have already been beaten back as unconstitutional.2°5 If 
anything, Lawrence strengthens the case against them, substantively 
and substantially. 
Consider in this regard the Supreme Court's decision in United 
States v. Morrison, which struck down an important provision of the 
federal Violence Against Women Act that had created a federal cause 
of action for victims of gender-motivated violence, including rape and 
domestic abuse. For the Morrison Court, this conclusion followed 
from the formalism that sex-based violence is non-economic and local, 
hence properly a matter of state, as opposed to federal, concern. For 
the Lawrence Court, sexual violence is not sex-based at all, but a crime 
against a person, following on the idea that sexuality is a matter of 
individual choice. As a constitutional judgment, it thus seems to 
suggest that the substantive flaw of the Violence Against Women 
Act's civil remedy provision was that it proceeded from a 
constitutionally problematic formulation of sexual abuse as a class­
based gender problem. Does the local, if not non-economic, "nature" 
of sexual violence place it (or at least some of it) within the right to 
sexual intimacy's protective sphere? Either way: So long as the Court 
adheres to the vision of sexuality that drives Lawrence, it is difficult to 
see how it could recognize a sex-equality right to be free from 
violating sex.206 
If, for example, prison officials were aware that inmate "rape was so common and 
uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep [but] instead . . .  would leave their 
beds and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guards' station," it would obviously 
be irrelevant to liability that the officials could not guess beforehand precisely who would 
attack whom. 
Id. (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 n.3 (1978)); see also, e.g. , Prison Rape 
Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (2003); Kaufman, supra note 98 
("Rape is often described as a fact of prison life. But no one knows exactly how widespread 
the problem really is. The Prison Rape Elimination Act is the federal government's attempt 
to define and end the problem."). See also supra note 175. 
204. See Spindelman, Reorienting Hardwick, supra note 4, at 446-84 (discussing the 
relevance of federal legislation, inter alia, to substantive constitutional interpretation); see 
also, e.g. , Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981); 
Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977). 
205. See, e.g. , United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
206. It may be true that Lawrence has broadly adopted an "emerging consensus" 
method of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g. , Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?, 
supra note 75, at 42 (response of Jeffrey Rosen) ("Was the Court wrong to appeal in 
Lawrence to an 'emerging democratic consensus' in America and Europe? I certainly think 
so."); see also id. at 32 (response of Robert H. Bork) ("Lawrence said little more than that 
attitudes toward homosexual sodomy have changed in the past 50 years . . . .  "); id. at 44 
(response of Cass R. Sunstein) (noting that Lawrence "referred to evolving social values" in 
its course, but "celebrat[ing) the Court's decision" in the case); id. at 46 (response of George 
Weigel) (criticizing Lawrence for "the standards the Court now invokes for its decision­
making," including '"emerging' democratic consensus"). But that still does not mean that 
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All this positions us squarely to engage Lawrence's assertion that 
gay men are sexually invulnerable - an assertion, that, for whatever it 
is worth, does make gays seem very much like straight men.207 The 
reply to this - the real substratum of the like-straight reasoning 
Lawrence endorses - should by now be clear. That gay relationships 
are by definition same-sexed does not mean that they do not involve 
persons who might be injured or coerced. They do.208 There can be 
inequalities between people of the same sex - in sexuality itself, 
including same-sex sexuality, structured on inequality in its 
hegemonic, male-dominant form.209 At the same time, that gay 
relationships are same-sexed does not mean that, by definition, they 
are relationships where sex is freely and coequally willed or 
determined - or equal. They are not.210 That is not the dominant 
structure of sexuality under the sexually unequal social conditions that 
frame the Court's understanding of sex - social conditions that its 
opinion in Lawrence reaffirms. If only it were. Without a doubt, it 
could be. 
The Court regrettably ignores these realities of sexuality and 
sexual abuse within the lesbian and gay communities. It thus drains 
"consent" of any real meaning through an act of judicial fiat that 
presumes consent from the fact that sex happens and that, finally and 
broadly, calls for sexuality's deregulation. The decision is underwritten 
by an ideology that holds that sex is fundamentally autonomous and 
mutual, thus consensual, hence harmless, because intimate. In lock 
step with the tautology that sexual relations are intimate because 
sexual, Lawrence discredits, hence legitimates, the harms that gay sex 
(like cross-sex sex) can entail. 
Seen in this light, a new perspective on the shift from Hardwick to 
Lawrence emerges - one not as cheery as the one on display in the 
lesbian and gay communities. The difference between Hardwick and 
Lawrence itself does not in important ways shape - or choke off - the evolution of 
constitutional norms. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 142-148. 
208. See, e.g. , John L. Baier et al., Patterns of Sexual Behavior, Coercion, and 
Victimization of University Students, 32 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 310 (1991); Pamela A. Brand & 
Aline H. Kidd, Frequency of Physical Aggression in Heterosexual and Female Homosexual 
Dyads, 59 PSYCHOL. REP. 1307 (1986); Gregory L. Greenwood et al., Battering Victimization 
Among a Probability-Based Sample of Men Who Have Sex With Men, 92 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1964 (2002); Tjaden et al., supra note 99; Lisa K. Waldner-Haugrud & Linda Vaden 
Gratch, Sexual Coercion in Gay/Lesbian Relationships: Descriptives and Gender Differences, 
12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 87 (1997). 
209. This is contrary to the notion that gay sex is definitinally non-subordinating, hence 
egalitarian, because same-sexed. It surfaces almost off-handedly, as it does in many other 
places, in Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence 
of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 CO LUM. L. REV. 1780, 1788-89 (1992). 
210. See, e.g. , John Leland, Silence Ending About Abuse in Gay Relationships, N.Y. 
nMES, Nov. 6, 2000, at A18; Struckman-Johnson & Struckman-Johnson, supra note 145. 
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Lawrence can be defined as the movement from a decision in which all 
gay sex is regarded as "an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape"211 to 
one in which there is presumably no such thing as gay-on-gay sexual 
abuse. When the alternative is criminal punishment for having sex one 
does not want to have, as well as sex that one does, this may properly 
be seen as progress. But neither Lawrence nor Hardwick, each of 
which stops short of constitutionally recognizing even the existence of 
lesbian and gay victims of sexual violence, requires the State to take 
action to deal with their sexual injuries - nothing, that is, actually to 
deliver them the freedom of sexual choice the opinion affirms in their 
name. To the contrary, by affirmatively denying the possibility of 
sexual injury in gay relationships and erecting a doctrinal edifice that, 
at the margins at least, is supposed to prefer less State regulation of 
sex to more,212 the Court's Lawrence opinion may unleash and 
safeguard the sex that as abuse is inflicted in them. In this respect, 
Lawrence goes farther than Hardwick does in the wrong direction. 
Nor, unfortunately, is that all. Remembering that the Court's like­
straight logic can run both ways,213 why should heterosexual sex be any 
different?214 When homosexuality can be defined phantasmatically and 
ideologically by the absence of sexual abuse, thus confusing 
perpetrators' fantasies and lies for victims' facts, why not 
heterosexuality, as well? Could it possibly be that, just as 
heterosexuality guides the Court's thinking about the need to afford 
constitutional protections to sexuality, it provides the organizing 
principle for the Lawrence Court's thinking about same-sex sexual 
abuse? 
Nobody appears seriously to doubt that Lawrence has given sex a 
constitutional boost. But whose, what kind, and at whose expense? 
Begged by the Court's opinion, the question's urgency is magnified, 
not dissipated, by the Court's unwillingness to address it - an 
unwillingness many academic commentators seem all too eagerly to 
share, having effectively affirmed it as their own. What Lawrence and 
the commentary about the case have given victims and survivors of 
sexual abuse so far is nothing - unless silence counts as something 
when it reaffirms the longstanding preference that victims of sexual 
abuse, along with their injuries, remain closeted, in which case, to be 
211. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring). 
212. See supra note 181. 
213. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, "Like Race" Arguments, in WHAT'S LEFT OF THEORY? 
NEW WORK ON THE POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 40, 66 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000) 
("To put it simply, a 'like race' argument that A is like B also implicitly claims that B is like 
A."). 
214. Cf SHEILA JEFFREYS, UNPACKING QUEER POLITTCS: A LESBIAN FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVE 145 (2003). 
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fair, Lawrence and the commentary about it, give them quite a bit. But 
survivors deserve better than that. And they deserve more. 
Meanwhile, Lawrence may offer those injured through sex a small, 
sliver of hope - a hope that sits on the horizon of tomorrow with 
which the Court's opinion ends. " [T]imes can blind us to certain truths 
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and 
proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom. "215 
Turning to those women and men, straight and gay, and others 
who are sexually violated: one day, some day, freedom will be yours. 
215. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. 
